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Vertical Restraints
and the Schwinn Doctrine:

Rules for the Creation and
Dissipation of Economic Power
Peter C. Carstensen*
The Supreme Court's rules on vertical restraints and in particular,the
rules promulgated in the Schwinn case, have been the subject of much
critical commentary. By synthesizing static and dynamic theory, the author develops an economic framework with which to analyze vertical restraint law. He propounds three criteria, incorporatingstatic and dynamic
considerations,which provide a basisfor vertical restraintrules.

I.

INTRODUCTION

IN THE DECADES since the enactment of the Sherman Act,'
the nation's economy has undergone massive growth and dramatic change. In few ways have this growth and change been
more apparent than with regard to the systems by which goods are
distributed. The radical changes in transportation, as well as those
in production and sales technologies, have made possible methods
and systems of distribution undreamed of at the turn of the century.
Coincident with the changing economy, economic theory has
undergone marked change. Traditional theories based on premises
of "pure" competition 2 have been supplemented by newer the* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. B.A. (1964)
University of Wisconsin; M.A., LL.B. (1968) Yale University.
The author is greatly indebted to Mr. Jerome Ott, a third-year student at the
University of Wisconsin Law School, for his assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce against Unlawful Restraints and
Monopolies, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), enacted July 2, 1890.
2. Pure competition exists where there are many sellers of fungible products
so that no producer has a large enough share of the market to have any control over
price. ISee P. SAMUELSON, EcoNo4iucs 482 (9th ed. 1973).
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ories based on premises of "monopolistic" competition. 3 The theories of Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall4 have been joined by
6
5
those of Chamberlin and Robinson. Schumpeter and J. M. Clark
have also exerted significant influence with their criticism of an
assumed, long-run equilibrium state in which demand and technology were fixed as a theory which does not provide a productive
framework within which to deal with the observable economic
world which is, in fact, a dynamic place with little equilibrium.
Thus, the tools of economic theory are no longer limited to those
constructed to analyze efficiency, in a long run static equilibrium,
but now also include those which provide different and more relevant perspectives on economic policy problems.
The tools of economic analysis are useful and perhaps indispensable, in the effort to explain economic activity. Economic
theories and models are tools of analysis; they are not answers.
These tools must be used in ways that are consistent with their assumptions and purposes. A model may serve as a good predictor
of future events even if it rests on a very bad description of how
events occur. 7 Such a model, however, cannot guide a policymaker because it will not direct him to relevant, real-world relationships.
Using economic analysis to explain or evaluate the basis for
antitrust rules and policy requires recognition of the assumptions on
which a model is built: what is assumed about the goals of firms,
their knowledge, the state of technology, demand, and entry conditions. The results of such a theory will be, or at least should be,
consistent with its assumptions. Hence, if the object of legal concern is a given in the model, the model will be of little help. Similarly, if the model takes something, e.g., technology, as a given or
treats it as an independent variable, then the outcome may have
only limited implication for a world in which that aspect is a dependent variable. It is therefore important to understand whether
a model is trying to describe how change occurs or what will happen if a change occurs outside of the model. Finally, the model
3. Monopolistic competition exists where many individual sellers face their own
nonhorizontal demand curves and thereby have some measure of control over price.
Id. at 483.
4. See A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES
OF ECONOMICS (1898).
5. E. CHAMBERLIN, THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1947); J.'
ROBINSON, IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933).
6. J. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1934); J.
CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS (1961).

7.

M.

FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE

ECONOMICS 3-46 (1953).
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may describe and explain events or advocate a policy required by
its theoretical underpinnings. Economics suffers from frequent confusion in the shift between a descriptive model of a hypothetical
case, e.g., pure competition, and the prescriptive conclusion that
all activity inconsistent with that model is undesirable.8
As economic analysis has developed and evolved, so too have
the policies and theories underlying the antitrust proscriptions. In
few areas has this been more manifest than in the area of vertical
restraint law. From its relatively simple beginnings in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co. 9, with its "thou shalt
not" proscription of vertical price fixing, a series of rules and exceptions has led inexorably to the complex and, to some, confusing
rules of United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.'0 For those commentators whose theoretical perspective is grounded in static
economic theory, the case law development has appeared to be
without a theoretical explanation. As Professor Posner has written,
for several generations the Supreme Court has been deciding restricted distribution cases without any theory
at all as to why manufacturers restrict distribution."
Given the theoretical perspective of commentators such as Posner, this perception of confusion is not without merit. But if a
framework includes dynamic economic theory which explains the
problem of change, innovation and power in the marketplace, then
the policy underpinnings of vertical restraint law become perceptible. It is the purpose of this article to suggest what such a framework might be and how it could alter the perception of the case
law.
The article first develops the economic theory necessary to understand the case law. After a brief discussion of the distribution
systems which the theory must explain, static economics is discussed and placed in the context of a dynamic economy and dynamic theory. The second part of the article reviews the development of the case law and its fit with the static-dynamic theoretical
framework. The final section evaluates this framework and the
case law, showing the utility and intelligibility of the Court's ap8. This is the basis of much of J. M. Clark's criticism of the use of models of
"perfect" competition. J. CLARK, supra note 6, at 471-76 (1961).

9.
10.
11.
stricted

220 U.S. 373 (1911).
388 U.S. 365 (1967).

Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the ReDistribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L.REv. 282, 285 (1975).
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proach in resolving contemporary legal-economic problems in a
world with both static and dynamic constraints.
This article does not develop a detailed economic model. Rather,
it is a suggestion for and outline of a framework in which to fit
vertical restraint law. Doubtless, more work can and should be
done in refining the framework and its application; the aim here
is to open the door and point the way for what may be a far more
fruitful mode of analysis than that which most lawyer-economists
2
seem to have applied.'
II.

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS: THE LAW,

ECONOMICS, AND THE MARKETPLACE

All distribution systems have been altered by the changes in
transportation, communications, and the producer-distributor structure. In an early suit dealing with resale price fixing, Dr. Miles
Medical Company alleged that it used newspapers, pamphlets,
handbills and, most importantly, druggists to promote its goods at
the point of sale.' 3 Today, as Miles Laboratories, the altered
corporation employs radio and television advertisements together
with printed media, with little reliance on point-of-sale persuasion.14 The introduction of radio and television as selling media,' 65
together with the growing sophistication of advertising itself,'
has transformed the whole selling process of many goods since
the customer can now be presold.' 7 The ability to presell has mark12. This article presents a different and, it is hoped, more useful way to evaluate
the economic environment in which legal rules dealing with economic power must
operate. The discussion does not present a rigorous model or theory, nor does it
work out all the implications of the suggested framework. This article is, at best, a
first approximation.
13. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
14. Miles Laboratories' products include Alka-Seltzer, Alka-Seltzer Plus, Miles
Nervine, One-A-Day Vitamins, Chocks Vitamins, Chocks Bugs Bunny Vitamins,
Bactine Antiseptic, Alka-2 and S.O.S. Scouring Pads. MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE,
INC., MOODY'S HANDBOOK OF COMMON STOCKS (1975). Miles was the 52nd largest
advertiser in 1974 spending a total of $43 million on all media. ADVERTISING AGE,
Aug. 18, 1975, at 156-57. Miles ranked eighth among drug and cosmetic producers.
Id. at 32. It was 25th among all T.V. spot advertisers. Id. at 106.
15. Radio advertising appeared only in the late 1920's and television was not
widely available until the 1950's. The evolution of these media transformed product
promotion and sale. For the first time, sellers had an alternative to dependence on
local retail promotion.
16. Advertising agencies themselves are primarily a product of the last halfcentury. This period also saw a significant advancement in social science understanding of how and why people respond to advertising. See V. PACKARD, THE
HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957).

17.

Preselling works most effectively with impulse and convenience items.

W. SCHULTZ, AMERICAN MARKETING 52-54 (1961).

As a product becomes more
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edly reduced the importance of the final sales location as a place
for persuasion, making it, in many cases, little more than a dispenser of a product with a preexisting demand. Advertising thus
transfers power from the final seller to any entity in the distribution
chain with the requisite size to engage in such promotion.
Promotional changes are not the only changes in distribution
over the years. New types of retail institutions have also emerged.
Department stores now divide a large facility into many specialized
departments and thereby achieve certain economies of scale both
in buying and in retailing in addition to the advantages of specialization. Multistore buying units have also evolved in order to take
advantage of volume purchases and have opened the way for the
creation of their own brand-name products.' 8 Still another remarkable change has been effected by shopping centers in which
the organizational function of collecting a complementary group of
retailers is undertaken by a promoter who is not a retailer at all.
The alterations at the intermediate level of distribution, wholesaling, are less visible but no less radical. Historically, wholesalers
were that part of the distribution chain where the wide inventory of
goods needed to serve some class of retailers was assembled.' 9
These goods came primarily from small manufacturers and went to
small retailers. As both retailers and manufacturers grew, however, they discovered and developed ways to handle these functions
that did not require the intermediary wholesalers: direct selling to
retailers; producer downstream integration into retailing; and distributor upstream integration into production. The role of the
wholesaler in contemporary distribution can be broken down into
various specific functions: storage and delivery, order-taking, billing and collecting, and, of course, selling. From a more or less
monolithic system, wholesale activity has become more specialized, with particular emphasis on functional activities. This, in
turn, has altered the relationships of the participants, producing
further dynamic pressures on the distribution system.
External factors have also altered the relationships within the
distribution system. Perhaps the most dramatic factor has been
the development of trucks capable of delivering products anywhere
complex and involves more choices and options, the final selling activity increases
in importance even though the customer is substantially presold. Id. at 54-56.
18. Buying groups which are commonly owned, such as Sears and Penney's,
have encountered few problems as a result of such efforts, but if they are joint
ventures among independent retailers, such control can produce problems. See
United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
19. J. PALAMOUNTAIN, THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 18 (1955).
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that usable highways exist, thereby extending the range and scope
of many competitive and distributive activities.
Despite all these changes, three basic techniques of distribution
remain: vertical integration, independent contracts for a variety of
specific services, and the use of independent distributors. None
of these methods of distribution necessarily excludes the use of the
others. Rather, producers are far more likely to use a combination
of the three: their own employees, some services such as warehousing or transportation provided by contractors, and delegation
of some of the responsibility for ultimate distribution to independent distributors. Hence, distribution is far more a matter of mixing the three methods to achieve an efficient system of product dissemination than it is a matter of selecting a method.20
In considering the distribution process, it is critical to observe
that inherent in both vertical integration and the use of contract
services is the necessity for producer control and direction over the
conduct of the employee or contractor providing the service.
Control is not essential to distribution activity carried on by an.independent business entity. Independence is a functional and relative concept; it means here that a business can function independently in distributing and reselling a good or service. Thus, a
producer can sell to an independent distributor, such as a hardware store, some light bulbs fully expecting the shopkeeper to resell them. He cannot expect an employee such as a salesman to
perform unless given directions which might include the identities
of prospective purchasers, geographic areas of coverage, and price
schedules. Similarly, an independent contractor, such as a trucker,
providing a specific service in relation to the distribution of some
product only acts pursuant to direction. Since this element of producer control or direction over employees or
contractors is essen21
tial, no legal system can absolutely outlaw it.
20. If a producer deals with a few buyers who buy in large lots, or if the producer, like many traditional craftsmen, makes goods, e.g., shoes, only for direct sale
in his own shop, the process of distribution is very simple. The need for an elaborate
distribution system results from two factors. First, distribution must become more
complex as the number and geographic dispersion of buyers increases and their
level of use declines or becomes less predictable. Second, as consumers become
more convenience-oriented and desire to obtain a product simultaneously with a
variety of related products, the producer's system must be able to get its product to
retail outlets to meet this demand. Only a sophisticated distribution system will
achieve an adequate dispersion of the product or a proper mix with related items.
As a general proposition, the more dispersed and complex the final market, the
more likely the producer will be to employ independent businesses in its distribution,
as a way to maximize distribution while minimizing costs.
21. As a practical matter it may be difficult to distinguish between some contract
services and independent distribution. Is a "sales agent" an independent business-
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Producer control is not inherent in the producer-independent
relationship and thus any restraint on independent distributors has
to rest on an agreement by such a distributor to be restrained.
Such agreements, absent unlawful conspiracy, however, are only
enforceable if the law deems them to be. Hence, the legal system, and not inherent economic relations, will determine the scope
of the right to enter into restrictive agreements. For this reason
the law must, and has, focused on the relationship of producer and
independent distributor. It is the need for a coherent policy on
which to base rules on vertical restraints which justifies a detailed
examination of the economic aspects of the situation.
For vertical restraint of independent distribution to be feasible,
substantial deviation from pure competition must exist. In pure competition, there are large numbers of producers making identical products. The prospect of buyers' substituting one firm's product for
that of another induces firms to keep prices as low as possible and
compels uniformity in price. Each firm perceives that external forces
fix its prices and that its level of production will not affect price.
In such a world, control over independent distribution of the kind
discussed here would be both impossible and pointless. It would be
impossible because any effort to control the resale of one's product
which is at all restrictive of, or contrary to, what a distributor wants
to do with it would result in the distributor's substitution of an idenical -product. It would be pointless to seek to control distributor
conduct because neither the producer nor the distributor could benefit from the control, given the existence of fungible substitutes.
Competing distributors handling other producers' goods could serve
the customers as well so that any price or other restraint which
deviated from market conditions would be impossible. In short,
lacking any power over the product, a producer has no ability and
no reason to try to alter the conduct of independent distribution by
means of restrictive agreements.
To make restraint possible or worthwhile, therefore, a producer
must either have, or have the prospect of acquiring, some monopoly
man who is distributing a product or is he merely providing a special service?
This distinction may become more difficult if, rather than delineating the functions
performed by various entities in a distribution system, it takes on legal significance.
For example, if greater antitrust freedom exists for the control of contract services
than for the restraint of independent distributors, it will make sense to try to make
a controlled business look like a contract service. The problem is further compounded
where the same entities are acting as both independent contractors and independent
distributors.
22. R. LEFTVICvI,
THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 22-46
(3d ed. 1966); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 12-13 (2d ed. 1971).
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power over its product. 23 The term monopoly is usually used in a
pejorative rather than a descriptive sense. Monopoly or market
power, in the sense of some control over a product's market, is not
an uncommon feature of the economic landscape. 24 Indeed, some
power over a product is probably more prevalent than is pure competition as a characteristic of industrial production. 25 Such power
23. Of the several commentators on the problem of vertical restraints, only
Preston makes this point forcefully. Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
506, 518 (1965). See also Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade, 3
J. LAW & ECON. 86 (1960).
To illustrate, the Sealy case involved a group of mattress producers making only a
fairly modest portion of all mattresses in the United States. United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). Several manufacturers combined to establish and promote
a trade name for a standardized mattress, and arguably, restricted each other's
competitive freedom with respect to these brands of mattresses to avoid free-rider
problems. The Supreme Court held the restraints as drafted to be illegal.
Posner argues that nine Sealy members produced such a small portion of all mattresses that there could be no restraint of trade. Posner, Antitrust Policy and he
Supreme Court, supra note 11, at 299 (1975). See also R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 225 (1974);
Bork, The Rule
of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J.
373, 428-29 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Bork, Part 11]. This analysis equates Sealy
mattresses with all mattresses, but if all mattresses were the same, there would be
no reason for a few producers of a fungible product to band together to advertise
and restrict each other's practices. The Sealy venture only makes sense if it is
viewed as an effort by a group of producers to shift from making just mattresses
to making a differentiated product: The Sealy mattress which had a differentiated
demand which could only be satisfied by producers of the branded product. This
analysis does not compel a conclusion that a court should or should not consider
the presence of close substitutes, nor does it suggest that it should be unlawful for
a group of producers to attempt jointly to differentiate a product. It does point out
that the facts make no analytical sense unless it is understood that the goal of the
venture was to create a differentiated product over which the participants would
have a "monopoly." In fact, when Posner diagrams the effect of resale price
maintenance, he shows its effect as being a new and declining demand curve for a
product reflecting implicit acceptance of the differentiation hypothesis. R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST CASES, supra, at 236. Similarly Bork presents a number of activities
which require some restraint on the competitive conduct of the participants. Bork,
Part II at 429-64. With the possible exceptions of information exchange and fraud
among joint venturers, all of the activities appear directed at changing, maximizing
in static terms, demand for a product which of necessity implies that the product is
differentiated.
24. Such power is the power to control prices, output, and quality within the
limits set by competitive alternatives. As those alternatives become closer, less
power remains, until, in the case of "perfect" monopolistic competition, the producer is left with no practical choice, although it can still select different levels of
production, price, and quality, because only one combination of these factors will
allow the producer to remain solvent.
25. Clark argues that some discretionary power is essential to the proper
balance between static and dynamic interests and so is essential to his conception of
workable competition. J. CLARK, supra note 6, at 471-76 (1961).
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can arise either from product differentiation, product uniqueness,
or a small enough number of producers that collectively, but perhaps
not collusively, controls production of a commodity. Such an
oligopoly group will appreciate that collectively it needs to meet
the competitive impact of substitutes and to promote total demand
for its own product, each member recognizing that all will share in
that increased demand. The power that results from such joint
action can be ephemeral because it exists only by virtue of the
willingness of the participant firms not to engage in strenuous competition inter se. Hence, oligopoly groups will have a strong interest in trying, if possible, to move toward product differentiation. 7
One way to do this is to develop brand names, special promotional
activities, or special distributor efforts. When this is possible, the
oligopolist escapes from its interdependent position in a group of
28
producers by developing its own segmented aspect of the market.
In the interest of simplicity, this discussion will use the producer of
a differentiated product as its reference point.

26. Power potential will arise if a product is sufficiently unique so that at least
some customers will continue to buy it if its price increases relative to other substitutable products. At this stage, the producer is free to choose a price within some
range of alternatives. As that range declines, the power is more limited. Static
analysis, moreover, shows that there is a point in that price range which will maximize
the profit of the firm holding cost and demand constant. The dynamic analysis,
however, indicates that a firm may rationally select some other price, higher or
lower than the optimal price, if that has desirable dynamic consequences.
27. Thus, the collective but presumably not collusive efforts of major beer brewers
to promote their several brands have had the effect of creating more product differentiation between those brands and the local and regional brands. As a result, the majors
can sell at a higher price and do not have to respond specifically to particular local
beer price cuts. See K. Elzinga, The Restructuring of the U.S. Brewing Industry,
MODERN BREWERY AGE, Oct. 14, 1974 at 52.
28. In this context, competitive pressure from close substitutes generates contradictory pressures. On the one hand, the close similarity of a substitute makes a
cartel in a single product a much less powerful device than if that substitute did not
exist. Since both customers and sellers can more easily substitute one product for
another, the pressure on the producers of both substitutes to engage in price competition increases. On the other hand, instead of spurring competition in terms of
consumer prices, this pressure may well result in more rigid cartel policing. Presumably, by scrupulously enforcing price and territorial restraints, the producer can
insulate sellers against intrabrand competition, thereby inducing those distributors
to favor the better-policed product in their selling efforts. The cost of this steppedup policing, however, may well reduce the producer's profits to a "normal" level.
In effect, the producers of substitutes will then be competing by the transfer of all
monopoly profit to the distributors. If producers can find no alternative method of
distribution, they may have to continue to operate the cartel since abandoning the
effort would only result in a decrease in the distributors' willingness to handle the
product causing further loss of sales and perhaps failure. In such a situation, the
producer will perceive its program of restraints as essential even though it is acting
as a cartel promoter and manager.
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Monopoly or market power as used in this discussion ought also
to be defined. A firm has power in its market when it has the ability
to make effective choices among prices and outputs all of which will
satisfy the demand for its product and will not result in losses to the
firm. Power thus means an area of discretion in which a firm is free
to select the price and output combination that it wishes without
risking its economic viability. This discretionary power can only
exist if a firm has a declining demand curve (its product is not a
complete substitute for others so that the firm will not lose all of its
customers as its price shifts) and if the cost of producing the amounts
demanded at individual price levels is less than the revenue that will
result (average cost of production must be less than average revenue). A pure competitor may be able to select among production
levels, but exercise of this discretion has, by definition, no effect
on price or other demand conditions. No relevant discretion is involved since there is no basis for choosing other than the most profitable level of production. To be sure, any non-purely competitive
firm will also have a point at which its profits will be maximized
within the firm's discretionary range; but the thesis of this view of
market or monopoly power is that what is important is that a firm
facing differentiated demand and having the choice of production
and price levels can elect some other level if there are reasons to do
SO.
.Restraints on the distribution of differentiated products 29 are
usually explained by two theories which view the restraints from
different perspectives: distributor cartel and producer efficiency.
Neither theory by itself purports to explain all cases, but at least in
static terms, either one or the other ought to explain any restraint.
The theory of the distributor cartel regards vertical restraints as
29. It is conceivable that a distributor cartel involving distributors unthreatened by new entrants could be based on a homogeneous product produced in a competitive situation. Absent a reasonably strong understanding, however, among the
competing producers that they will operate a producers' cartel to which the distribution cartels are an adjunct, distributors are likely to seek alternative sources of supply
which would make a distributor cartel unlikely in practice. So, when one finds a
restraint on the resale of such a homogeneous product the overwhelming inference
is that it is a manifestation of a producer cartel arrangement.
Two cases involving sugar seem to be explicable in these terms. See Chicago
Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 948 (1950); Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Co., 291 F. 29 (9th
Cir. 1923), discussed in Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of
Goods, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 254, 269-70 (1960). Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925), may reflect a similar situation, but
the effective control in that case lay in informed producers' not selling more cement
than" the buyer needed for its own use rather than any actual reliance on resale
restraint.
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a means of implementing horizontal combinations by the reduction

or elimination of competition among participating firms.30 In its
crudest form, the distributor cartel theory assumes an antecedent
agreement among the distributors as to the type of cartel required

and the conditions to be imposed on its members.31 If the producer
is t6 have the necessary-distribution network, -it-must bow to dis-

tributor pressure to place restraints in its distribution contracts and
enforce their terms, because of the aggregate market power of the

conspiring distributors. Restraints need not be placed directly on
price; a system of territorial assignments or customer restrictions
may provide sufficient division of markets among competing retailers
to produce the desired (or achievable) level of market power through
reduction of competition.32

Although some cases may not fit within the terms of the crude
distributor conspiracy theory, they may comport with a variation of
that theory: the producer-promoted distributor cartel. A producer
will benefit from organizing such a cartel if the promised elimination

of cut-rate sales of its branded product will induce sufficient dealer
loyalty and market sales that the producer's profits are enhanced.33

Only rigorous manufacturer supervision will control free-rider problems which would34threaten the continued existence of a distributors'
shared monopoly.
30. This is an element of most government briefs in the area; see, e.g., Brief
for United States, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 255 (1963); Brief for
United States, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) excerpts reprinted in R. POSNER, supra note 23, 266-72 (1974). It is one of the bases
for the decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911), discussed infra at notes 109-26 and accompanying text. Since scholars on
the whole are critics, this theory, which justifies much of the judicial attitude toward vertical restraints, has received little scholarly development. But see Telser,
supra note 23.
31. The history of resale price maintenance in the proprietary drug field provides a prototypical example. J. PALAMOUNTAIN JR., supra note 19, at 90-106
(1955). For example, California druggists in 1935 took all Pepsodent products off
their shelves until Pepsodent reinstituted resale price maintenance and made a
suitable contribution to the druggists' trade association. Id. at 238-39.
32. It may be that some retailers are more concerned with their competitive
relationships with other types of retailers and not their competition inter se. Id.
at 38-48. In this case they will be more interested in customer classification or
territorial assignment than in direct price control.
33. The cartel theory is not the only explanation for restraints on distributors.
The cartel analysis requires that each distributor have an understanding that it will
be sheltered from intrabrand competition. Therefore, a genuinely unilateral customer or territorial restraint by a producer, unaccompanied by an understanding
that the producer would protect the distributor from the competition of other distributors in that territory, would lack the horizontal mutuality which the cartel
theory requires, and could not be explained at all by the cartel theory. Cf. Preston,
supra note 23, at 507.
34. Bork, Part II at 405-06.
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In addition, there are some restraints in which the distributors
submitting to them are aware that other distributors are subject to
the same constraints, and, in the absence of the restraints, would not
distribute in the required way, thus demonstrating that there is at
least an implicit agreement among distributors. Such agreements
have been specifically permitted under antitrust decrees. These
agreements include location clauses, profit-passover requirements,
and assignment of areas or customers of primary responsibility.",
If all vertical restraints which rest on some horizontal understanding
between distributors were the product of cartels, the logical antitrust
solution would be to dissolve such "cartels" and prohibit any restraint. The absence of such a policy of enforcement suggests that
courts and antitrust enforcement agencies have persuaded themselves that some restraint, even when it has a clearly horizontal
element, can be essential to the operation of an independent distribution system and therefore should not be forbidden.
This perception lies at the heart of the other method of analyzing
vertical restraints: efficiency in distribution. In order to understand
how control over distribution can promote efficiency, it is necessary
to recall that only firms with some market power, actual or potential,
can restrict distribution. A key characteristic of such a monopolistic
competitor is that the demand for its product at any price is limited.
The limitation arises from the willingness of customers to substitute
less preferred alternatives or to abstain from use of the product as,
its price goes up, and the unwillingness of some customers of alternative products to buy the specific product as its price declines. This
implies that a monopolistic competitor can expand its sales volume
by reducing the price or by changing demand for its product while
its price remains unchanged. The ability and incentive to reduce
price or to change its demand schedule distinguish the monopolistic
competitor from the pure competitor.
A monopolistic competitor will only seek to increase its sales
volume if the return on the additional sales exceeds the costs of
production and distribution. This result furthers the efficient use of
resources because the value of the additional products to their consumers exceeds the cost of producing the additional goods. If
consumers do value this use of resources more than any alternative

74,391,
35. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, 1973-1 Trade Cas.
at 93,797 (N.D. Ill.), modified 1973-I Trade Cas. $ 74,485, at 94,153 (N.D. Ill.),
affd per curium, 414 U.S. 801 (1973); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
72,480, at 85,568 (N.D. IIl. 1968); United States v. Sealy, Inc.,
1968 Trade Cas.
1967 Trade Cas. 72,327 at 84,855 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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use,36 the new level of production is more efficient in its use of resources than the old level.37
The usual argument for efficiency in vertical restraints focuses on
demand-affecting conduct. In general, this conduct seeks toincrease
product differentiation.38 Whenever the product is of a convenience
nature or relatively simple to select, the producer can try to reach
customers directly and promote the product so that its distinctions
will be recognized. In such cases, the direct selling efforts of the
producer are sufficient to achieve differentiation. But when the product needs promotion, or servicing, or display to generate the requisite
differentiation, the producer needs the active assistance of the distributor. While a distributor may make some effort on its own,
greater effort might create added differentiation and expand sales to
a more efficient level of production. But so long as other distributors
benefit from these promotional activities while one distributor alone
pays their cost, no distributor will engage in them. No distributor
will make a special effort if it is probable that the advantage from
the effort will be realized by the producer in the form of greater sales,
but will not also be realized by the distributor who made the effort.
In other words, a distributor will want power over the product in
which it invests special efforts. The solution to this free-rider problem 39 is to impose restraints on the competition among distributors
so that each is accorded power With respect to some customers. To
get the desired special effort,, then, the producer assigns a distributor
to a limited and exclusive territory or set of customers, or insures
that there will be no intrabrand price competition. This protection
compensates the distributor for its efforts. -Bork, Preston, and Telser,
among others, have described the kinds of efforts which producers
can obtain by use of such restraints.40 While not always explicitly
recognized as demand-affecting effort in these discussions, a close
examination of how the special efforts operate reveals that they
are, indeed, aimed at changing demand for the specific, differentiated product.
36. See, e.g., Bork, Part II at 473-74.
37. Id. at 402-03. For other examples of efficiency analysis, see Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas under the Antitrust Laws, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 111
(1962); Robinson, supra note 29; Rowland, Designing Distribution Systems: Antitrust Problems in Franchisingand Marketing, 34 Mo. L. REV. 178 (1969).
38. Differentiation can arise from making different products, E. CHAMBERLIN,
supra note 5, or by segmenting customers and selling to each segment in different
ways, MARKET SEGMENTATION CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS (J. Engel, H. Fiorillo & M. Cayley eds. 1973).
39. Bork, Part II at 430-38, 453-54.
40. Id. at 430 lists six categories of special or joint efforts.
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The second way a producer may seek to expand production is by
a price reduction to consumers. Distributors will pass along this
price reduction, absent special controls, if the markets in which they
sell have sufficient intrabrand or interbrand competition. But distributors, due to location and other reasons, may well have market
power of their own; that is, they do not face sufficient competition to
force them to adhere to producer wishes. _If the product is differentiated and, presumably, attractive to the distributor, the producer
has some leverage. In essence, each needs the other. On this
basis, a bargain can be struck in which the lower price is passed on
to customers in return for other guarantees which enable the distributor to share in the resulting improvement in the producer's
market position.
The efficiency analysis, then, assumes that a distributor will have
interests which are directly counterposed to those of the producersupplier. In general, the producer-supplier wishes to sell the
maximum quantity of its products necessary to keep its production
facilities within a range of maximum profitability. The distributor,
on the other hand, wishes to charge the maximum price and to
make the minimum effort necessary for its return. An efficiencyjustified restraint of this kind is, nevertheless, a multilateral understanding which reduces horizontal competition. In this respect,'the
efficiency-based restrictive agreement will be indistinguishable from
a cartel agreement. There are, however, significant differences in
both the motivation for and the understanding of the agreement.
The motivation for an efficiency agreement is primarily producer
interest in achieving maximum sales effort and optimal service for
a differentiated product. In static terms, a producer with these
goals has no interest in providing more restraint than is essential
to obtain the desired level of distributor activity. This creates an
inherent conflict of interest between the producer and a distributor
who wants the maximum competitive restrairit on other distributors.
The producer seeking efficient distribution is no longer proposing to
act as manager, for a fee, of a horizontal conspiracy. Rather, the
producer is proposing a joint venture with certain distributors in
which the restraints are those reasonably necessary- to achieve efficient distribution. To maximize their efficiency, the joint venturers
imust behave in ways inconsistent with complete independence,
that is, they must partly integrate their efforts.
In evaluating the implications for legal policy of the cartel and
efficiency explanations, the choice of economic perspective is vital.
Thus, Professor Bork, proceeding from a static equilibrium analysis, argues that any vertical restraint must be either for a cartel or
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an efficiency purpose, but not for both. Further, except for errors
in judgment, only reasonable and necessary restraints will occur
when efficient distribution is the goal. Th6 producer gains nothing
by imposing greater restraint, and it cannot get the maximum effi-

ciency with less.41
Equilibrium economic analysis is central to Bork's argument.
The analysis assumes a given technology, i.e., costs of production,

and a set of consumer preferences which manifest themselves in
demand schedules for different products. Given these costs and
demands, there is a determinate set of most efficient prices and out-

puts that are possible when the economy is in equilibrium. The
static analysis treats distribution restraints in comparative terms.
The model assumes a given "state of technology and managerial
sophistication at the moment" 42 and that demand at any level of

production is determined by forces outside of the model.43 It then
considers the output that will result with and without a restraint.

Under this approach, it would be misleading to speak of this conduct
as power creating or demand altering in a dynamic sense, since in
the static view the power or demand was always there, potentially,
and all that is happening is efficient operation of a business to max-

imize its profit potential.
Under this approach, given the relationship of cost and demand
(both of which are, themselves, given), market power is deter-

mined.44 Not surprisingly, since power is the difference between
two givens, it can be demonstrated in static terms that vertical
41.

Id. at415-16.
42. Id. at 393.
43. In this model, potential demand is variable within a range and the role of
restraints is to bring the highest possible level of demand into existence. But
the range in which demand fluctuates must be regarded as determined by forces
outside the model. Any other conclusion would make demand in part a function
of the firm's selling effort and would imply that demand is not solely the product
of consumer desires which the producer recognizes and taps.
44. In fact, market power is a most inapt discription since power connotes a
dynamic force whereas in the static model, there is only a potential for more or
less profit based on the supply and demand conditions in which a firm operates.
Maximization of profits in such a context is only the efficient use of power and
not the creation of a powerful position in the market. For this reason, in the static
model a firm has no reason not to seek the profit maximizing and most efficient
combination of price and output (that combination may vary depending on the
considerations of new entry.) It should also be noted that in the static model,
firms in perfect pure or monopolistic competition do not have market power because their costs of production just equal their revenues at the most efficient point
so they have no discretion to choose any other level of output and break even.
By definition a monopolist is a firm which in equilibrium has costs that are less than
revenues and has genuine discretion to choose some other production and price
-

level.
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combinations will not change power.45 This is the keyjo Bork's
conclusion of per se lawfulness for vertical restraints. They cannot
create or augment market power; 46 they can only relate to achieving
maximum efficiency.
Even in the static model, however, a horizontal combination of
competitors creates a new control over all production in a market
and gives its possessors power which those combining did not have
individually because of the alteration of the scope of control over
the market. Consistent with this principle, Bork recognizes that,
even if a restraint has a clear efficiency justification, it must be
tested by a rule of reason if it involves two or more competing firms,
since even in static terms, it will involve a change in market power.4 7
The participants may benefit from both that increase in market
power and from the efficiency produced by the joint venture which
required the restraint.
Absent judicial review of their conduct, therefore, they cannot
be expected to employ the minimum restraint needed to achieve
their joint venture goal.48 Within the framework of static analysis,
the distinction between horizontal and vertical is logical, vital, and
supports Bork's conclusion.
Because market power in a static approach can only be created
by agreement between or among competitors, it follows that once it
is established that the restraint is truly vertical, it can have no
market-distorting or competitively undesirable effects. This also
means to Bork that an apparent vertical restraint must either be
horizontal and a product of a cartel or truly vertical, but never both.
These conclusions follow from the nature of the approach and do
not go beyond it. The static model does not purport to describe
45. This is done well in Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The
Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 195-201 (1955).
The basic argument is that there is only so much profit to be had from a set of
customers and, therefore, adding levels of monopoly will not change this result or
increase the monopolist's profit. Under certain conditions this conclusion has been
questioned even as a correct statement in static terms. See Hay, An Economic
Analysis of Vertical Integration, I IND. ORG. REV. 188 (1974).
46. Bork, Part II at 402.
47. The power in such a case arises from the possible transformation of a
competitive market into a monopolized one by virtue of the combination of competitors. Given the degree of market control it can make possible, any such combination will inherently have the potential for monopoly. The question in a particular case will be whether the purpose or effect of restraints is to make possible
unnecessary monopoly power (power beyond that incidental to the legitimate needs
of the joint venture). Thus, the combination does not create power in the sense of
establishing something which the conditions of supply, demand, and market share
did not make possible by their given character. The combination is only a vehicle
by which the existing power potential may be captured and exploited.
48. Bork, Part II at 429-65.
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how market power emerges, is controlled, and can be dissipated.
Specifically, the model does not explain how, when, or why demand
or costs will shift, nor does it explain when and how particular firms
might influence this process. 49 It explains only how firms will
respond to such shifts once they have occurred on the assumption

that the new conditions will last forever.

Only a theory which

treats these elements as variables dependent in part, or under certain circumstances dependent on other controllable variables, can

truly illuminate the questions of whether and how vertical restraints
can create market power. Before turning
are a few caveats that should be noted as
Bork's conclusions, even in static terms.
ducers-can recognize and accurately_ define

to such a theory, there
to the persuasiveness of
Bork assumes that prothe exact scope of their

interests. In a world of unchanging conditions, a profit-maximizing
producer can discover, at least by trial and error, the most efficient

combination of restraints.50

But if a firm is uncertain of its dis-

tributors' likely response to a change in restraint or is unsure of

the potential effects of either increasing or reducing restraints, it
becomes less likely that any firm will seek- an optimal Jevel of
restraint.51 A firm will make more efforts to find an optimal level
if failure to justify the restraint will lead to some sanction or if a
business or its executives will suffer for an "error" of judgment.
Furthermore, where such sanctions exist, the well-advised executive
may well err on the side of less restraint, thereby producing the
least restrictive distribution system rather than the optimally re49.

This failing is repeatedly cited as the great gap in classic economic analysis.
supra note 6, at 178-209, 609 (1961); J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 6, at
30-39 (1961). See also J. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE (2d ed. 1971).
50. Of course, if a producer is earning monopoly income as it starts this process, it will be under no economic compulsion to achieve maximum efficiency will
produce greater profits. So long as one level of restraint produces satisfactory return, the fact that another might produce more will not be compelling if risks and
uncertainty are associated with the experiment. See Simon, Theories of DecisionMaking in Economics and Behavioral Science, 69 AM. ECON. REv. 253, 262-65
(June, 1959). Thus, the tendency toward the most efficient restraint is not selfexecuting, particularly where there is strong managerial control. See R. POSNER,
ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 12 (1972). On the other hand, a firm which is
making normal profits or less will be strongly motivated to find the most efficient
distribution system.
51. Repeated experimentation with and fine-tuning of a set of restraints will
often be impractical because the data derived from past experience will be only
partially applicable in a changed world. Thus, if consumer preferences shift, or
new selling systems emerge, or new products change the substitution relationships
and alter the nature of product interaction, the world of static equilibrium is lost.
In this changing world, the ability of a producer to evaluate his options and consistently make the most efficient choice of restraints is more highly questionable.
Indeed, the whole concept of efficiency becomes unsettled in the context of a larger
dynamic process.

J. CLARK,

788

-
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strictive system.5 2 To the extent that rules against vertical restraints
lead to a less than optimal distribution system in a static world,
which by definition must have an optimal level of restraint,53 the
rules themselves are inefficient, and, therefore, undesirable.
Finally, using a distributor to assist in product differentiation
or distribution of an already differentiated product through an
independent distributor creates the potential for monopoly power
or may reinforce the position of the distributor as a monopolistic
or oligopolistic competitor in its own right. Thus, in trying to
achieve efficient distribution, or in trying to achieve product differentiation itself, a producer finds that it is creating or dealing with a second
level of monopoly in its distributor. This result is inevitable whenever the existing conditions (f distribution or those created by a
producer seeking product differentiation result in differentiation
at the distributive level.
A producer, in order to use restraints, has to have some power,
and the special distribution efforts should create additions to this
power by increasing sales volume to the most profitable level.
Moreover, the producer is dealing with a separate and independent
distribution system and inevitably faces the problem of sharing
power with these distributors. In those cases, where some power
exists at both levels, the first problem is whether and how the parties
may vary their initial power endowments from the way that power
would have been distributed absent agreement by use of restraints.
Secondly, in all cases, the power to be allocated includes power
created by the joint efforts of the producer and the distributor which
has engaged in special efforts to promote the product, so the sum
of the combination is more than was inherent in its parts. Because
of the free-rider problem, the power created by joint efforts can
generally be created or allocated only by assuring all distributors
how each will interact with the others and with potential new
distributors. To the extent that the distributors become all-powerful over new entry and operate in totally closed territories, they
have, as a group, been allocated the bulk of the power. Conversely,
to the extent that the producer has freedom to replace a distributor
or to create competition for a distributor, or both, the producer has
received control over the new, jointly created market power. To
52. Critics of the present law emphasize the impact of this uncertainty.
Hibner, Selected Problems in Vertical Restraint Cases-The Need for Predictability,
26 MERCER L. REV. 911 (1975); Izard, Stanton & Ross, Of Bicycles and Beer:
Vertical Territory and Customer Restraintsfrom Schwinn to Coors, 26 MERCER L.
REV. 507 (1975). The pressure of this uncertainty as to what types of restraints
are legally justifiable ought to induce more effort to find effective alternatives.
53. But see note 56 infra.

1976]

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND SCHWINN

evaluate the efficiency argument, it is important to realize that
restraints not only facilitate the performance of special efforts by
curing the free-rider problem, but that they also allocate both
existing power and newly created power whenever such power
54
exists under the control of both producer and distributor.
The implication of this analysis is that the formulation of policy
with respect to vertical restraints is the formulation of policy with
respect to the creation and allocation of market power. The
necessity for legally valid agreements to make possible the vertical
restriction of independent business demands that decisionmakers
choose between favoring monopolistic competition and favoring pure
competition. The policy choices from a static perspective are
limited, but not unimportant. In. the view of some writers, there
is a possibility of a choice between monopolistic competition and
pure competition. Under either model, goods can be produced at
costs that do not mandate the desirability of one approach or the
other. In such a world, if it existed, it is not clear whether perfect
pure competition or perfect monopoly competition is preferable.
Perfect pure competition has lower costs and perfect monopoly
competition has greater product variation so the choice between the
two is no longer clear.55 The result favored, assuming equilibrium,
will depend on the relative value assigned to price and variety by
decisionmakers. In the more usual view, it is assumed that the conditions of cost and demand under alternative regimes of pure and
monopolistic competition will determine that one or the other is
more efficient and therefore preferable. In either case, the static
theory postulates that the economy is moving toward that equilibrium, and the goal of legal policy is that equilibrium be reached as
fast and as inexpensively as possible. The first obvious implication
of this general policy is that restraints based on cartels ought always to be illegal. They represent an abuse of market power
which results in lower production and higher costs to society. They,
by definition, serve no efficiency interest.
With respect to efficiency-based restraints, since the economic
power and potential power involved therein already existed, and
the restraint operates to expand production in light of that power,
54.

This is a classic negotiation situation which can be compared to the econK. J. COHEN & R. CYERT, THEORY OF THE FIRM: RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN A MARKET ECONOMY 229-41 (1965). The interdependence

omist's duopoly problem.

inherent in the vertical relationship between producers and distributors makes it
relatively easy for them to reach a solution to their shared monopoly problem.
See also R.

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW,

55. E. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 5, at 214-15.
at 15, 21-22.

ch. 24 (1974).
See also Scherer, supra note 22,
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the only question is whether this power is used efficiently. The truly
vertical agreement will produce more sales than no agreement between the producer and the distributor given the differentiated
nature of the product and the potential of distributor power. Moreover, the interdependence of the parties makes such negotiation
possible. There is no reason to believe, however, that the market
will naturally push all monopolistic competitors into the perfect
equilibrium conditions. Those conditions require that all real
market power be squeezed out of the relationship, not by altruistic
acts by the parties to the agreement, but by the entry of enough
closely substitutable products to provide the maximum number of
alternatives that total demand in the economy will sustain, thus
eliminating by monopolistic competition the monopoly profit that
would otherwise exist. If existing firms can create any barriers to
entry, by patent, copyright, advertising, or special distribution efforts, some residuum of economic power will remain. Hence, even
in static terms, there is a basis for concern over the conditions in
which the equilibrium is sought.56
Rules of law will play a substantial role in determining the
relative possibility for pure and monopolistic competition, the
speed and certainty with which these processes reach their equilibrium, and the methods available for the pursuit of monopolistic
position. A legal system which confers patent rights on inventors,
copyrights and trademarks on advertisers, protects manufacturers'
trade secrets and legalizes restraints on distributors, has created
56. This very simplistic view does not do justice to the problem of determining the optimal resource allocation in a world of pure and monopolistic competition in which at least some imperfections will remain. In such a world at equilibrium, the necessary conditions for a completely optimal, efficient resource allocation
do not exist. The problem is then one of deciding which set of second-best solutions will put that world closest to the optimal condition assuming equilibrium.
Professor Markovits has undertaken the task in general terms of specifying how
policymakers can seek to improve conditions of allocative efficiency in such a world.
Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our WorseThan-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wisc. L. REV. 950. This analysis combines a Chamberlinian perspective on the nature of market relationships
with the use of the general theory of the second-best. It raises very serious problems for any simple approach to efficient resource allocation in equilibrium situations. The recent publication and substantial length and complexity of the argument have precluded any significant consideration of its implications for
re-evaluating the traditional analysis of allocative efficiency reflected in the text.
In any event, this article takes the position that optimality in equilibrium terms,
something which assumes technology and demand as largely determined by external
forces, is not the sole basis or even the most relevant basis for antitrust policy
analysis in a dynamic world in which there are no givens, and in fact it may be
that conditions, inefficient and undesirable in equilibrium, are essential to the
process of dynamic change.
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a series of rights by which monopolistic competition can be furthered. The choice of rights and their definition will shape and influence the methods participants utilize in their attempts at product
differentiation. If several possible ways exist to achieve that goal,
anyone seeking it will presumably opt for the method or methods
which provide, relative to their cost and efficiency, the greatest and
longest lasting monopolistic position vis-h-vis other competing or
potentially competing substitutes.
In selecting and defining the legal rights which businesses
may have, the legal system is, at least implicitly, making a selection
between more or less perfect pure competition or monopolistic
competition. Legal devices which permit the further differentiation
of heretofore undifferentiated products are devices which functionally encourage monopolistic competition in favor of pure competition. The definition of legal rights which provides a basis for differentiation will also influence the speed and certainty with which
their users move from a position of monopoly to one of monopolistic competition. The greater the scope of power and the
longer its duration, the greater is the potential for its user to acquire a position which is unchallengeable by the potentially competitive substitutes which exist or which could exist in the market.
This means that the legal definition of rights can operate to speed
or retard the movement toward equilibrium according to their role
in differentiation activity.
A dynamic theory of economic power must address the causation and control of growth and change in an economy.5 7 A good
starting point is Mason's paradigm of industrial organization 58
that postulates initial "basic conditions" of supply and demand
57. Many efforts in this direction have attempted to describe in macroeconomic
terms what the conditions for growth in any economy are. They do not present
any view of the firm or related microeconomic issues. In another direction, such
writers as Schumpeter have sought to demonstrate that static efficiency and maximized growth are not necessarily consistent. J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 6, discussed in F. SCHERER, supra note 22, at 20-21. Others, such as Galbraith, have
argued that market power is essential for firms to control their own future which
itself is essential in the present day and age. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 49.
The theory of workable competition associated with J. M. Clark has more direct
relevance. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON.
REv. 241, 241-56 (1940). See also J. CLARK, supra note 6. The literature is reviewed
in Sosnick, A Critique of Concepts of Workable Competition, 72 Q. J. ECON. 380,
380-423 (1958). The theory of workable competition rejects the usefulness of static
models and substitutes a concern for dynamic evaluation of economic institutions
involving structural, conduct, and performance criteria to determine whether markets are or are not reasonably competitive. Id. See also F. SCHERER, supra note
22, at 36-38.
58. Id. at 4-5.
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which in the first instance determine parameters of "market structure." Market structure, in turn, sets conditions for "conduct"
which, in turn, controls "performance." But in addition to that
sequence, the paradigm recognizes that conduct influences market
structure and basic conditions and that structure itself will also
affect conditions. This is a theory of dynamic interaction. It
asserts a series of market performance characteristics as its goal.
The performance goals such as equity, progress, and efficiency are
so general and may have such different measures in varied time
frames that their assimilation into a more explicit model is very
difficult.
The efforts to grapple with economic dynamics have thus tended
to become descriptive of what is and how it got that way. This
descriptive approach leads to a Panglossian perception of reality
in which what has happened is treated as if it ought to have happened and interference with this evolution is discouraged as uneconomic and potentially harmful to the smooth running of the
60
economy. 59 The approach does not mandate such conclusions.
The heart of the problem for the dynamic-model builder is that in
a dynamic world the dimensions of the problem are constantly
changing and there is no such thing as equilibrium.
To be useful in an analysis of economic power, a dynamic theory
should describe the causes of change, whether in cost or demand,
the interaction between changes, and power implications of changes
of different types. Explanations of the ways a firm interacts with
its future and seeks to control it can involve use of game theory,61
behavioral models,62 and other theories.63 These efforts do not
focus directly on analysis of the problems of monopoly and market
59. Thus, Galbraith rejects antitrust enforcement as an arbitrary interference
with the new industrial world. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 49, at 184-97. Clark has
similarly restrained enthusiasm for efforts seeking to impose rules on the natural
order. J. CLARK, supra note 6, at 324-25.
60. See Stigler, Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Antitrust
Policy: Market Power and Business Conduct: Some Comments, 46 AM. ECON. REv.
496, 505 (1956).
Compare C. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING CoMPETITION (1949) and
Adams, Market Structure and Corporate Power: The Horizontal Dominance Hypothesis Reconsidered, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1276 (1974) with J. CLARK, supra note 49,
at 324-25 and J. GALBRAITH, supra note 49, at 184-97.
61. See J. VON NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND EcoNOMIC BEHAVIOR (1964) and M. SHUBIK, STRATEGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE
(1959).

62.

R.

CYERT & J.

WILLIAMSON,

THE

MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM

ECONOMICS

OF

OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM

63. W.
F.

SCHERER,

BAUMOL,

DISCRETIONARY

BEHAVIOR:

(1963); 0.

MANAGERIAL

(1964).

BUSINESS BEHAVIOR,

supra note 22, at 27-38, 285-303.

VALUE AND GROWTH

(1968).

See also
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As a result, they are not responsive to the issues which

this discussion considers.
The long run goal of any firm in a dynamic world is to accumulate and to entrench sufficient market power to assure some monop-

oly profit. 64 A firm may effect this goal by charging lower prices or
by segmenting the market demand curve. If the producer, by
changing the manner of sale, distribution, product design, service,

and quality control, can differentiate the product in consumers'
minds, thereby altering his demand curve, that is, making it less
price elastic, then a lower production cost will not necessarily be the
primary corporate goal or strategy. Indeed, the product differen-

tiation of the kind required may increase production costs.
In dynamic terms, then, the interest of the firm is not in its cost

or demand in isolation, but rather in preserving the spread between
them, i.e., preserving or increasing its potential profit. Corporate
management may even risk reduction of income in order to assure
the longrun stability of the firm's profit margin.65
There is a significant implication of the static model for dynamic
concerns. The model of pure competition does suggest that a firm

operating in such an environment, even in a dynamic world, ought
to focus its attention on reducing its costs. Such a firm faces a
horizontal demand. It can sell as much as it wants at a given price,
none at any higher price, and would be giving away value to sell at
a price below present market. If the firm sought to change demand,
any actual change would redound to the benefit of the industry as
a whole.66 In such a world, a firm ought to focus primarily on its
64. To the extent that static analysis has a motivating force for change, it is the
drive for monopoly position; the proposition that a business will seek more rather
than less profit, and more rather than less certainty of that profit, appears sensible.
If it is stated in this manner, the proposition falls short of the rigorous maximization
hypothesis employed in static analysis, but is clearly related to it. Stated in this
manner, it does identify the goal of a firm in a dynamic world.
65. This presumes that the managers own the business, that the shareholders
lack the capacity or awareness to resist management's decisions, or that the shareholders agree that a long run, but reduced profit stream is worth more to them than
short run profit maximization.
66. The industry of which this firm is a part might collectively regard demand
as an element to be changed but will act only if joint action can be achieved and
if the member firms can capture a sufficient level of profits to justify the effort. In
the classic model, such a gain would be temporary at best. The model assumes
(a) that all existing firms were operating at the most efficient rate of output, and (b)
that new entry by equally efficient firms will occur if existing firms make excess
profits. Therefore, when demand rises existing firms increase production. Because
of their cost increases, however, the firms do not expand production to satisfy the
new demand completely. As a result, prices rise, yielding some excess profit to the
existing firms and offering the prospect of monopoly profits to new entrants. Entry
then occurs, and production by existing firms declines until each firm is again
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costs of production, and conclude that it is pointless to try to exercise control over the larger world, especially product demand.
The monopolistic or oligopolistic competitor confronts a directly
variable demand and is able to survive at several levels of demand. 67 The monopolistic competitor has the potential to influence an added dimension of its existence because an increase in
the amount of its product demanded at a given price will directly
change its own environment. Any firm with a variable demand
for its product faces directly the dynamic questions of what causes
change in demand, how the present level of return (the relationship of demand to cost) can be maintained, and how it can be increased. 61
But while the static model shows that monopolistic competitors
interact with the economic environment in which they operate in a
way that is significantly and strikingly different from that in which
purely competitive firms interact, 69 the static models of monopoly
and monopolistic competition do not answer the dynamic quesproducing at the most efficient level. The number of firms should have increased so
that all added demand at the new cost level is supplied. Thus, even the industry gets
no long run advantage out of changing demand, unless the assumption about entry
can be changed. K. COHEN & R. CYERT, THEORY OF THE FIRM: RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN A MARKET ECONOMY, 149-53 (1965).

67. "Survival" here means the resulting losses will not be so devastating that
the alternative is economically impossible, even if it implies negative earnings on
an accounting basis. This would include, therefore, some monopolistic competitors
which are not presently making monopoly profits, i.e. have some clear freedom of
action, but which can nevertheless survive for a while in an effort to alter their economic world.
68. Whether such changes in demand must be only at the expense of other
producers or whether total consumption in an economy can be changed is significant for broader economic analysis. This is not a suitable place to get into an
extended inquiry about macroeconomics. Suffice it to say, the Keynesian analysis
suggests that total consumption is a variable which can be controlled, in part at least.
To
KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936).
what extent individual producers can act directly to shift consumption totals or
broad patterns is not addressed in the usual analysis; but, some commentators have
asserted that such control is essential for the survival of major corporations. J.
Certainly, there is a need for more
GALBRAITH, supra note 49, at 203-07 (1967).
explicit theorizing and empirical investigation into the question of the interaction for
firm and industry demand with total consumption functions in our economy.
69. The significance of this in explaining the role of monopolistic and oligopolistic competitors in innovation is substantial. Such firms have, by definition, the
actual or potential resources to support innovative efforts, but in a static model
given such a firm which already had power, it was not clear why it would invest in
any project or which projects it would select. Viewing the firm in a long run monopolistic competition with other firms or industries, its interest in innovation is clearthis is a way to increase or preserve existing market power-and its agenda for innovation is also clearer. It will prefer those innovations, either technological or
otherwise, which serve to strengthen its position over time in the market. Hence, a
drug firm may value innovative advertising of its products which serves to create
J.
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tions; they only reveal what should happen to maximize present
profit assuming that such conduct will not affect future power.7 '
If it is assumed that vertical restraints do play-or can play-a significant role in the creation and allocation of market power, it then
becomes necessary to formulate a policy toward such restraints in)
dynamic terms.
Professor William Adam's recent article explicates the dynamics
of the creation and entrenchment of market power in the context
of merger analysis, but his analysis can be more generally applied.70
Adams' argument, in broad terms, is that firms of substantial size
act in part to enhance and to preserve their long run economic
power. The implication for distribution is that large producers
would seek to impose restraints on distributors in a manner which
would minimize the distributors' potential future economic power.7 2
For example, a manufacturer might confer favorable limitations on
price competition or assign territories to its distributors, thus giving
the distributors increased short run profits in order to constrain
their future freedom of conduct and, thereby, their future ability to
develop power at their levels that could be turned against the producer. In order to make such restraints mutually agreeable, it is
only necessary that the producer value future power a bit more
than the distributor. If an individual distributor has substantial
short run concerns or a great uncertainty about long run considerations; he may be quite willing to mortgage his future, nebulous,
and uncertain power, perhaps to his later regret. 73 Adams' large
for them a special market over investments in new basic or applied pharmacology.
Thus a dynamic view of monopolistic competition helps to explain why innovation
may be reasonable for the firm even if it is not necessarily socially desirable.
70. Adams, supra note 60. Another relevant article is Comanor, Vertical Territorialand Customer Restrictions: White Motor And its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1419 (1968), which is a rebuttal to Bork. Comanor's discussion does not make clear
that the basis of disagreement is primarily in the economic approaches being employed, not in the conclusions that can be drawn from those economic models. See
also Gould & Yamey, Professor Bork on Vertical Price Fixing, 76 YALE L. REV. 722
(1967), Bork, A Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 YALE L. REV. 731 (1967).
71. The limits of pure static analysis have been recognized in this connection
and various qualifications, most notably the theory of limit pricing, have been offered. Bain, A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, 39 AM. ECON. REv.
440 (1949). The theory of limit pricing, whatever its merits, see Markovits, Potential Competition, Limit Price Theory and the Legality of Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers Under the American Antitrust Laws, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 658, is a
recognition that market power is dynamic and that the optimal conditions of static
theory are not optimal over time or when entry conditions become variable.
72. Id. at 1280-81.
73. A good explanation for many of the franchise restraint cases, e.g., Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), and Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), is that the distributors have reached
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firm can be equated with all firms which fit the definition of monopolistic or oligopolistic competitors-firms which evidence an interest
in the future state of demand for their product.
A primary problem with dynamic analysis, however, is that,
lacking a detailed model of the dynamic aspects of the economy, it
also lacks specific rules or tests with which to evaluate whether a
change facilitated by producer restraints would, in fact, be desirable.7 4 Even if it is presumed that change is desirable, policymakers will have no guidance in dealing with distribution restraints,
since both the presence and absence of restraint will influence the
quantum of change. The prohibition of all distribution restraints
would permit the retention of power by those already so possessed.
A rule permitting all restraints would also yield a similar result
since restraints that would wrest power from producers would be
equally effective in preserving that power. This result is objectionable if change in the marketplace is to be directed at the erosion of
entrenched power and at the facilitation of the transfer of power
from those who have power to those who do not. Clearly, an agnostic approach to power is no more neutral in effect than is total
damnation.
The broad social and political distrust of unchecked power in
the hands of any institution is characteristic of our political and
economic heritage. Neale noted the importance of this sentiment
in antitrust law:
It is always hoped that any particular holder of power,
whether political or economic, will be subject to the threat
and at the
of encroachment by other authorities .
same time that any authority which seeks to encroach
on another's power will be strenuously resisted and held
in check . . . . It is important to this conception that the
individual's right to engage in business activities of his
own shall be preserved and that no single economic unit,
whether in monopoly or combination, shall be able to exclude rivals at its own behest and so render its own power
immune from invasion. 5
a point at which they regret their initial bargain and realize that they now value the
lost freedom more highly than h'efore.
74. Adams' concern is primarily to establish that nonhorizontal mergers create
means by which market power can be exercised or created. Adams, supra note 60,
at 1281. Having demonstrated this, he can conclude that since the Clayton Act
forbids mergers which have such effects, any such merger is illegal. This analysis
is successful within its specific statutory frame of reference, but it does not provide
guidance outside of that framework. To extend the analysis, it must be determined
when and where added power is desirable.
75. A. D. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
430 (1970).
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This preference for erosion of established power and for 'rules
which impair the ability to entrench power is justifiable in both
static and dynamic economic terms. Viewed through a static
framework, entrenched economic power permits the producer to
produce at a level that, although profitable to him, results in diminished consumer want satisfaction and, therefore, inefficient resource allocation. Viewed in a dynamic framework, the more entrenched a producer's power has become, the greater its capacity
to control or frustrate dynamic change. Such power may be used
to restrict or retard socially desirable change thereby greatly increasing the costs of change to society. The general dynamic mandate, then, is to prefer those arrangements least likely to create
economic power in the future.
The static justification assumes that if less power is permitted
at the production level, the result will be, at worst, not much less
efficient than if more power exists on that level. This is a valid
premise with respect to restraints, if it is true that efficiency is not
dependent on a unique set of relationships which mandate a single
level of restraint. The dynamic justification assumes that the greater
the existing power is in an economy, the more difficult change will
be. It may be, however, that the greater power produces more
monopolistic pressure which acts as a stimulus to change. The
source of power may be important, and to the extent that economic
power is derived from political, social, or legal power, it will be
harder to overcome.76 This perspective suggests the difficulty with
evaluating restraints. As restraints approach firm and enforceable
legal rights, they may weaken the dynamic capacity of the economy.
This is particularly true because their legal character may preserve
these restraints long past their dynamic usefulness and may permit
an otherwise no longer economically powerful entity still endowed
With legal rights -to capture and control unreasonable quantities of
ne, power. To the extent that legal rights manifest changing economic realities, they will change in response to the power dynamics
of the market. Restraints in a dynamic approach must be limited
to those reflecting economic power as far as possible.
This suggests that dynamic analysis should focus on the existing power of those engaged in the restraint. 77 The greater the ex76. Power based on purely economic advantage is likely to attract investment
in developing ways to share this advantage, that is, alternative or duplicative technologies will be sought after. Power based on legal or political power, precedent,
or position, however, suggests that resources are best employed in seeking legal
protection through investment in legislative, political or judicial resources and not
in trying to find better ways to produce or distribute goods.
77. Adams, supra note 60, at 1287-90.
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isting power of the firm, the more reluctant a court should be to
allow the use of restraints, even purely vertical ones, to expand
or to entrench that power. A dynamic approach would apply a
strict rule against any restraint imposed by a very large firm because such firms may further increase their market power over
time by this device. 78 Logically, small firms or new entrants ought
to be subject to different and less onerous rules until they have
obtained a reasonable quantum of power.
In this initial formulation, the dynamic approach does not
concern itself with the static distinction between cartel and efficiency restraints. The crucial concern is the role of the legal
system in setting the direction of the power transfer.79 Thus, if a
few marginal distributors combine with a marginal or failing producer to create a cartel in which the participating distributors receive territorial and price security, the combination could be regarded as a dynamically favorable event because it transfers power
away from the more powerful distributors and the leading producers. A static efficiency analysis 80 would demonstrate that this result was inefficient"' since the producer would have failed without
the cartel.8 2
78. Integration must be the concern of antitrust policy whether or not it is
associated with ostensible horizontal dominance. Efforts to curb parallel
integration, acquisition of assets generating substantial internal funds, or
restrictive practices facilitating the use of power investment funds should
not be made contingent on a finding of horizontal dominance of some distinct market.
The simplest procedure for accomplishing that task is to establish a
rebuttable presumption against any of the leading 200 firms in the country
either acquiring another corporation or adopting one of the restrictive practices identified in the Clayton Act (such as requirements contracts or exclusive dealing). In effect, such a procedure would express the belief that
once a firm reaches a certain scale the probability it will injure competition
by means of integration or certain business practices is so great that the
firm should carry the burden of justifying its desired course of conduct.
Id. at 1292.
79. In dynamic terms, any transfer of power away from those possessed of
power could be regarded as positive since even a cartel, an inefficient transfer device,
would stimulate the firms who lose power to competitive reactions.
80. In the static analysis, it is hard to identify the source of the cartel power.
Assuming that a seller needed an exclusive label in order for it to be able to use its
power over customers, and that the only way to get such a label was to combine the
buying ability of a group of such sellers to obtain a common product, it is possible to
imagine a cartel based on the product of a marginal producer. See also GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 1974-I Trade Cas. 75,072, withdrawn for rehearing en banc 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,435 (9th Cir. 1974).
81. The static argument for competition over monopoly and, therefore, against
cartels as a form of monopoly is well made in F. SCHERER, supra note 22, at 12-19.
See also McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant
Marine, 27 U. CHi. L. REV. 191 (1960).
82. Had that firm failed, it would have either created greater sales opportunities
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But dynamic analysis is not necessarily indifferent to the basis
of a power-shifting device. Some power-shifting devices which are
unrelated to increased efficiency may prove undesirable even under
dynamic evaluation.
Thus, where a cartel agreement creates
power unjustified by, and unrelated to, any change in the efficient
conduct of distribution, dynamic analysis may conclude that such an
arrangement is so unlikely to produce real economic benefits that,
even if the beneficiaries are powerless, the restraint is without
justification. In other words, if the only justification is the power
transfer itself, the restraint is not dynamically justified because
such a shift in power is not socially desirable if it has no present
or future economic efficiency to justify its occurrence. Conversely,
an efficient restraint which enhances the power of an already powerful firm might be justified by the present value of the increased
efficiency, at least if the chosen distribution method is the only means
of achieving the socially desired level of efficiency.
A further implication of the dynamic analysis is that there is
no reason to believe that a restraint can necessarily be classified/"
as either purely efficiency or cartel in natfure. In a dynamic context, a restraint may combine cartel and efficiency motivations. The
efficiency motivations may be a shorter-run event, a dynamic adjustment accepted by the parties in order to combine efforts to produce new power. Once created, that power will continue because
its creation involved dynamic change in the economic environment.
A cartel aspect to this same agreement would then provide for
the. allocation of that newly created power and seek to control future conduct in order to perpetuate that power among the cartel
members.8 3 Once this potential for a dual aim of restrictive distribution agreements is recognized, that is, creation of future
power and allocation of that power, then the complexity of the
economic analysis is apparent. This suggests that a decisionmaker
may face irresolvable ambiguity if he either tries to say that a restraint is to create a cartel or to achieve efficiency or if he tries to
allocate weights to the motives for a restraint.14 This has great
significance for the legal system and its policies because it postulates that any rules dependent upon a distinction between cartel
for more efficient competitors and/or opened the way for new entry by a more efficient
firm.
83. It is possible to reverse the argument: A cartel might be the immediate goal
through which the participants can realize profits to engage in innovation or otherwise make dynamic changes in the distribution or market structure.
84. The Sealy case reveals such a dynamic change in the market for mattresses.
See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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and efficiency restraints will be costly, difficult, and uncertain in a dynamic world.
Dynamic analysis thus greatly complicates the policymaking
process. And it is this threatened complexity that may explain
why in many areas of law opinions reflect an otherwise inexplicable refusal to consider the dynamic consequence of rules.8 5 But
the rules on vertical restraints deal, as they must, with power and
power-producing relationships. Hence, a court's refusal to include
dynamic considerations in its deliberations would produce confusion.
Dynamic analysis cannot and should not replace static analysis.
Static analysis focuses on the issue of efficient use of resources in
equilibrium conditions. As such, it is a powerful tool for the analysis and evaluation of many economic problems, 6 problems about
which dynamic analysis would perhaps have little to say of any value,
but it is not a tool which deals with the issue of the creation or
maintenance of economic power except in the case of horizontal
combination. Therefore, it will not by itself be a very relevant
tool for that set of antitrust problems which involve creation and
maintenance of power in the market.
85. As Posner has demonstrated, there is a remarkable congruence between
the mandates of many common law rules in torts, property, and contract, and the
rules which the static model of economic equilibrium would project in order to
achieve the most economically efficient results. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW, ch. 2-5 (1972). Judges probably find it hard to regard their own activities as
part of an ongoing dynamic process. Thus, a static view of the world in which the
only issue is the efficiency implication of a rule of law is perhaps a necessary simplification to avoid concern with secondary, dynamic problems which are often too
broad for any particular case and too amorphous and incremental in impact to be
dealt with constructively in a case by case context. In altering a rule of law, a
judge is, in fact, changing the environment in which the parties operate and this
will trigger the search for a new equilibrium. Judicial nonrecognition of the implications of law for changing the environment perpetrates the myth that the common law simply restates and reapplies preexisting rules and has no independent
policymaking power. Policymaking is in essence a dynamic activity, an effort to
change the givens of the environment in which equilibrium is sought. Economic
planning is so frequently ineffective because it does not take into account that it is
action to change the environment in ways which will facilitate further change.
Hirschman & Lindblom, Economic Development, Research and Development, Policy
Making: Some Converging Views, 7 BEHAVIORAL Sci. 211 (1962). See also D.
BAYBROOKE & C. E. LINDBLOM,

A

STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY EVALUATION AS

A SOCIAL PROCESS (1963).
Given that they are not the only actors in our legal
system, the courts are often well-advised not to undertake the task of assessing the
dynamic implications of their acts. Cf. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist
Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972). Such is not the case when the issue facing the
court is that of the dynamic implications of economic power.
86. Tax policy analysis can frequently proceed on the basis of an efficiency
analysis. Certainly, the rejection of cartels under antitrust laws is fully supported
by a static economic efficiency analysis. See, e.g., McGee, supra note 81.
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Consideration of the dynamic and static aspects of the market
as well as the monopolistic position which underlies restricted
distribution increases not only the complexity, but also the realism
of the evaluative framework far beyond that based on solely cartel
and efficiency theories.
The complexity of the problem is revealed in the cases themselves and can be illustrated by an analysis of two recent decisions.
Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC,87 involved a challenge to the restrictive practices which Coors had employed to control the prices and
territorial freedom of its wholesale distributors and the pricing
freedom of its retailers. In essence, Coors had required its distributors to sell only within specific geographic areas and only to
retailers who would abide by Coors' suggested retail prices. Besides promotional activities, the wholesaler was expected to distribute Coors beer exclusively, to make a substantial investment
in specialized warehousing facilities and, presumably, to develop
a distribution system. It is noteworthy that since Coors used a
brewery process which did not include pasteurization, the flavor
of its beer was easily damaged unless the beer was kept properly
refrigerated at all times.8 8 This necessitated special distributor investment in refrigeration systems for warehouse facilities.89
In the early 1960's Coors decided to expand. In pursuit of this
goal, the brewer exercised stringent controls over its distribution
process. When Coors first entered a target market, it would sell
its beer to taverns stipulating that the beer should be resold only
at the premium price although Coors would charge the tavern
owner a lower price than he would have to pay for other premium
beers. 90 Having once established its presence in the premium
beer market through its tavern marketing, Coors would then move
into retail stores, particularly supermarkets, where its product
would be priced a few cents below other premium brands. 91 In a
little over a decade, Coors had captured one-third of the market
and had become the largest selling beer in California. Ii is now
the fourth-largest brewer in the country even though it markets
87. 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). See also
Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, (5th Cir. 1975); Adolph Coors
60,187 (D. Colo. 1975); R. E.
Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 1975 Trade Cas.
Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d 653, 112 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974).
88. The Brewery That Breaks All the Rules, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 22, 1970,

at 60.
89.
wishes.
90.
91.

It costs about $50,000 more to equip the warehouses in the way Coors
Ignoring the Rules, 103 FORBES, Feb. 1, 1969, at 34.
Id.
Id.
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in only eleven states.92 The hard question is whether these results
were accomplished by a cartel or through greater efficiency.
A cartel approach would analyze Coors' actions as those of a
producer of a somewhat differentiated beer attempting to make itself more attractive to wholesale distributors. Most retailers will
93
be interested in promoting a beer which guarantees a good return

and that return can only be attained if there is control over price
competition. In order to obtain the desired distribution, the brewer
creates a beer retailing cartel in which the participants are assured
that no one will break the price line. This assurance, once given,
makes the product more attractive to the retailer than other close
substitutes not promising similar price security. If a retailer or
wholesaler were to succumb to the cheating urge, the pricing structure would be broken down, so distributors, with the assistance of
the producer, will watch retailers' sales prices closely. In order
to reduce the potential for "cheating" by wholesalers and to insure
that the source of beer at each retail location is known, the wholesaler is assigned to a territory and given a price schedule to follow.
This procedure fosters a wholesale cartel which includes all distributors who, by respecting each other's territories and maintaining
the uniform retail price, help to preserve and promote the illusion
of Coors' distinction to consumers and thus insure profitability to
retailers. If the territory assigned to a distributor is of a reasonable
size so that the distributor can operate efficiently, it can also share
in the monopoly profit. If this distributive plan is to yield real profit for its participants, the product itself should be reasonably distinctive within its class.94 In other words, there has to be some
basis on which the cartel is to operate, but, once such a basis is
established, it is the skill of the conspirators that determines the
degree of its success.
This approach would tend to view the ostentatious insistance on
a single brewery, antedeluvian advertising, lack of pasteurization,
92. The Wall Street Journal, September 11, 1975, at 24, col. 1.
93. Coors charges lower prices to wholesalers and the latter charge lower prices
to retailers. The Brewery That Breaks All the Rules, BUSINESS WEEK, August 22,
1970, at 61. The result is a larger return at each distributive level provided the prices
for the next level are not subject to competition.
94. There is some evidence that Coors is distinctive. The Milwaukee Journal,
February 18, 1975; 34 CONSUMER REPORTS 474 (1969). There is also evidence that
beer drinkers cannot tell beers apart and that their preferences are almost entirely
manipulable by advertising and other image-making activity. Ackoff & Einshoff,
Advertising Research at Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1968-74), 16 SLOAN MANAGEMENT
REV. 1, 12 (1975). (Subjects shown differing commercials about identical beer with
differing brand labels "all . . . believed that the brands were different and that they
could tell the differences . . . . Most felt that at least one of the four brands was
not fit for human consumption.")
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and need for special distributors' facilities as part of the necessary
hokum to establish a basis for the cartel-a differentiated product,
sufficient to support the monopoly profit demands of the several
layers of participants.
An efficiency explanation of the same facts would start by reference to the problems faced by a small brewer desiring to expand,
especially its need for substantial distribution through wholesaler
outlets95 and for large investment by these independent wholesalers in both promotional activity and in the special facilities for
Coors' distribution. No independent distributor could consider an
investment of this size keyed to a product manufactured and controlled by another, in the absence of some understanding that the
producer would not unreasonably compromise the chances of return.
When the program also requires carefully timed price adjustments and coordinated marketing to insure the success of a total
effort, it is necessary to draft a careful understanding that assigns a
clearly defined role to each participant and sets forth clear territorial and price limitations. In fact, there is substantial restraint
on the freedom of the individual participants, but their restraint is
essential to the joint-venture nature of the distribution. This
distribution system may rigidify so that its members and the structure itself become inflexible. An efficiency analysis would also
suggest that there are many other beers which are chemically similar
and which have well-established distribution systems. The existence of these other brands would support the inference that this
effort was a joint venture between a producer and its distributors
organized to compete effectively and efficiently within the existing
distribution networks.
Without an examination of all the evidence in Coors, it is impossible to denominate one or the other of these explanations as
the more nearly correct. Certainly the explanations differ markedly
in the way the same facts are viewed and characterized. In a
static analysis, the problem is simply deciding which explanation,
cartel or efficiency-based joint venture, is better. The clear implication is that a cartel is inefficient and undesirable; if only some aspect
of the distribution system is cartel-like in character, it is reprehensible to that degree. Otherwise, a system like the one Coors developed is acceptable as provocative of competition in the market.
In considering the validity or efficiency explanations, however, it
may be relevant that other brewers do not use the same system.
95. In California, neither a brewer nor its wholesaler can provide direct assistance to or financing for a retailer, so the only available route to compensate retailers for their investment in and risk taking on a new beer is to assure them of a
reasonable price. See CAL. CORP. CODE 25501 (West 1964).
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A dynamic perspective would stress Coors' rise from obscurity
to dominance in an eleven-state region displacing the leading national beers. In California alone, it acquired more than one-third
of the market. All of this occurred at a time when regional brewing
was said to be on the wane and a significant trend toward concentration in the industry was emerging. 96 Whether cartel- or efficiency-based, Coors worked a radical change in the market. Furthermore, it does not appear to be easily reversible by merely
eliminating the restraints. A dynamic analysis might well use
Coors' program as an example of the use of distribution restraints
to create and allocate market power.
It does not follow, however, that just because the restraint had a
desirable effect on the loci of power in the market, the preservation
of such restraints is desirable. Coors' distributors are now leading
beer merchants in their assigned territories. To continue to allow
their actual and potential competition with each other and with
other distributors in handling Coors and competing beers to be directed by Coors rather than by each distributor's business judgment
places control of a substantial segment of the beer distribution
process into the hands of one producer. Dynamic analysis would
suggest that whatever the mixture of cartel and efficiency motivation
that went into the creation and evolution of Coors' leading market
position, the restraints were not harmful to a long run interest in
dynamic competition until the participants had achieved a leading position. At that somewhat indefinite time, the restraints
became objectionable because they now permitted a leading producer and leading distributors to combine their power to the detriment of dynamic competition.
GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc.97 has excited much
discussion98 even though the Ninth Circuit withdrew the opinion
to permit reargument en banc. 99 The facts, as reported, are that
in the early 1960's Sylvania faced the prospect of the total loss of
its television business. Instead of withdrawing from the market
and without, so far as appears, making any change in its product,
Sylvania adopted a policy of handling its own wholesale activity
96. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); MODERN BREWERY AGE, October 14, 1974, at

52.
97. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. 75,072 (9th
Cir. 1974), withdrawn for rehearing en banc, 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,435 (9th Cir.
1974).
98. See e.g. 1975 DUKE L.J. 935; 26 MERCER L. REV. 629 (1975); N.C.L. REV.
775 (1975); 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1087 (1975).
99. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 1974-2 Trade Cas.
75,435
(9th Cir. 1974).
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and allowing only a limited number of retailers in any geographic
area to handle its product and then only in authorized locations.
The purpose of this policy was "to reduce intrabrand competition
. .as an incentive for them [retailers] to carry and promote the
Sylvania brand."'
The apparent effect of this program was that
Sylvania increased its market share from between 1 and 2 percent
in 1962 to 5 percent in 1965. Sylvania did not insist on exclusivity
nor did it give dealers a veto over awards of new franchises to locations near the dealers' assigned location.
Continental, a retailer with eight permitted locations, became
embroiled in various controversies with Sylvania about the granting
of a franchise to another dealer in the San Francisco area, Continental's addition of an unauthorized location, and a change in
Sylvania's credit terms with Continental. During this period,
Continental moved many of its Sylvania products to its new unauthorized location, resulting in the loss of its franchises for all
locations.
A jury verdict for Continental on an instruction which made
any restriction on outlets or store locations unlawful per se was
appealed by Sylvania to the Ninth Circuit. Neither Judge Skopil,
writing for the majority, nor Judge Ely, in dissent, presented adequate data upon which to determine whether this program was
cartel- or efficiency-based. The court did not inquire into Sylvania's
reasons for creating "elbow room" among its retailers. Sylvania
may have created a cartel for a group QLretailersusing the residual
value in the Sylvania trade name to provide a product each could
sell without facing competition from the identical item in the hands
of other retailers. Or Sylvania may have fairly concluded that, in
light of its marginal positi6fi,-ily- ifTaretailer were fairly sure that
it could recapture all its sales effort could retailers be-obtai'ed and
--etaiied for its products which would provide the necessary promotional effort. Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion,
however, suggests that the franchisee had any defined duties with
respect to promotional or other investments in the Sylvania products. In addition, the retailer could sell other brands of TV's, and
Sylvania could introduce new sellers at its discretion. The looseness
of these controls cuts equally against either a cartel or efficiency
explanation. Under a cartel theory, the greater managerial discretion to select participants and the freedom for the participants to
decide how much of a commitment to make to the cartel may
balance and manager can introduce new members only if existing
members would not respond by reducing their own commitments.
100.

GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. at 96,793.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:771

In an efficiency analysis, the manager's discretion undercuts the argument that promotional services can only be had by the detailed
protection of the seller. But the retailer's freedom of choice in its
own allocation of promotional efforts offsets the producer's discretionary power and creates, perhaps, more of a bargaining context.
Judge Skopil and Judge Ely both recognize an aspect of the
static-dynamic problem in their opinions, and agreed that restraints
introduced to save an otherwise failing firm might be subject to a
different standard. This is a dynamic analysis. Neither majority
nor dissent distinguished between cartel- and efficiency-promoting
restraints as dynamic devices. The majority concluded that
Since the antitrust laws are concerned with the preservation of competition in a relevant market, the possible loss
of Sylvania's competition in that market was of legitimate
concern. But there are several crucial flaws in Sylvania's
argument in the present context. If an otherwise illegal
practice may be justified at one point of time under the
"failing-company" doctrine, it is not necessarily forever
after justified regardless of changes of circumstances.
[Citation omitted]. Sylvania's proffered instruction overstated the doctrine. More important, the evidence which
it offered was not particularly relevant to the circumstances
in the case. The danger of failure was in the early sixties.
By Sylvania's own testimony, it has prospered and increased
its market share to five percent by 1965, when these events
occurred. Furthermore, its market share in Sacramento
was ten percent. Sylvania makes no claim it was about to
leave the television business in 1965. It is important to
recall that the case focused not so much on location restrictions as an abstraction but on what Sylvania did to Continental in the fall of 1965. We agree that there was insufficient evidence to go to the jury that Sylvania's conduct
toward Continental was necessary to enable it to remain in
the television industry. Therefore, the trial judge properly
refused the instruction.'0 '
Judge Ely objected in his dissent:
.. . United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. [citation
omitted] indicates that the defense is available in cases
wherein a vertical restraint is being challenged. Unlike
merger or acquisition situations, which involve a single
challenged act, a vertical restraint usually involves an ongoing practice or method of distribution. For the defense
to be available, a company must show that prior to the
institution of the practice it was failing economically. And
101.

Id. at 96,796.
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the company should be able, I think, to justify the on-going
use of the practice by showing that, but for the restraint,
the company would still fail. Here, the majority takes the
position that Sylvania could not be entitled to the defense
unless the company is in a failing state as long as the practice continues. To me, it is inconceivable that such an
unreasonable, incongrous result was0 2intended by the Supreme Court in its Schwinn decision.

-

The majority thus recognized some scope to this dynamic defense but, without defining that defense very precisely, rejected it
on the grounds of failure of proof. In this latter context, Judge
Ely's comment that a restraint might be necessary for an indeterminate period of time in order to save a company from failure
suggests that a cartel created by a failing firm should be lawful if
it makes a success of its organizer even though the retailer participants are taking the less attractive goods only in order to get
the cartel advantage and would cease to handle the product in
the absence ol' that advantage. In the absence of indefinite
continuation of the restraint (cartel), the firm will arguably still
fail. Imputing that view to the dissent,,a reader might consistently
imply that the majority would restrict the failing-company defense
to cases in which the restraint directly made possible a change in
a relevant aspect of a product or its promotion, thus creating new
relationships from which new power would evolve. Once this new
.power had evolved, the restraint could be terminated,, having-served
its purpose l y providing either a short-term boost in profits- or a
degree of certainty from which the producer could improve its
product or its distribution system. This issue is obscured in GTE
by the efforts of both Judge Skopil and Judge Ely to fit their conclusions into the Schwinn language without regard to a more
fundamental analysis of what problems the rules of vertical restraints face and how they attempt to resolve those problems.
Both Coors and GTE reveal the difficulty of applying traditional
cartel and efficiency explanations for vertical restraints and suggest
that some clear-cut standards would both save time and promote
clarity of decision. In establishing such standards, however, courts
must consider both static and dynamic implications and must decide to what degree the legal system can induce change in economic
phenomena without creating long run risks of inefficiency. In a
truly determinate model, the system operates, changes, and grows
independently of the social or legal context. In less overtly
deterministic formulations, this proposition takes the form of a
102.

Id. at 96,802 (footnotes omitted).
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suggestion that law operates either to help or to hinder the achievement of the most efficient economy.1 0 3 But under neither formulation does law have a constructive role to play in changing fundamental costs, technology, or demand. Traditional static analysis
gives rise to this determinism because it assumes that the legal
system is a given which is a factor in determining costs. Even the
long run equilibrium deals only with the alternative costs that are
possible given expertise, knowledge, and potential. Once again,
then, there is an implicit holding constant of the legal system. On
the assumption that the economic system is fundamental and that
the legal system is derived from it, the lawyer-economist can
determine which rule is more efficient by comparing static results
under different sets of rules. But this determination assumes ihat
the economic system, and perhaps its changes, are given, and
that at any point in time there is only one efficient way of doing
things. The conclusion as to which rule is more efficient follows
from the deterministic perceptions of the classic model, which always shows a single most efficient point and implies by the use of a
single continuous cost curve that there are not alternative ways
of behaving. If the economic system is responsive to changes in
other aspects of life, the deterministic problem is complicated
because different states of economic activity imply different human
conduct which is not easily or quickly rearranged by legal rules for
behavior. In a broader perspective, however, this interaction
destroys the easy determinism of the lawyer-economist, since interaction between legal rules and the economic system suggests that
the economic system should be efficient in terms of the rules and its
dynamics should be responsive to social priorities.
This view would justify a belief in law as a reforming and social
planning device. 10 4 A rule which alters some significant aspect of
commercial life will have the effect of changing conduct if the
cost of avoiding the rule is too great. 10 5 Once this cost threshold is
crossed, the legal rule, and not the economic one, will govern conduct.
In the deterministic view, such a rule of law will generate no change
103. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (1972), is an example of this
kind of covert determinism. Its implications are discussed in Leff, Economic Analysis
of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).
104. Posner recognizes not only that change occurs, but also that both law and
business have conspicuously sought such results. R. POSNER, supra note 103, at 299,
333.
105. This cost will include both the transaction costs associated with dealing with
beneficiaries of the new rule and the payments to those beneficiaries to waive their
rights under the rule (because it is presumed that the old way was more profitable,
i.e., efficient, the actual payments can be made provided the cost of the transaction is
not too great). This is covered in more detail in id. ch. 23.
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in the economic foundations, only continued market inefficiency.
But even the static economic model suggests that further analysis
is in order. If the costs of doing business in a particular way
change, the static model would support substitution of different
and less expensive elements for the new, costly elements. The
firm might substitute capital for labor or direct selling for sales to
independent distributors. In essence, then, a firm may change its
method of doing business rather than just sustain the costs of
continuing the same practice. The static approach considers such
a change to be, by definition, a more costly way of doing business
than would have been employed in the absence of the rules. Therefore, if the rules were eliminated, the old practice would reoccur.
It is crucial to this assumption that all costs remain fixed relative
to each other. If an innovation occurred outside the static model
which reduced costs, at least to the level of cost under the old
method, then even if the rule was withdrawn, no changes would occur.
In a dynamic world, however, technology and ways of doing business are not given. If changes are responsive to external pressures
such as cost changes, then rules in a dynamic world should cause a
firm to evaluate present and alternative methods of operation. 0 6
Unless it is assumed that changes are entirely independent of incentive, the changed incentive ought to produce new and different
directions for innovation. Innovation responsive to new rules will
not necessarily follow their formulation, but changes can and probably will come about with some frequency. Such innovation results
in the development of new ways of doing business which can be as
efficient, or perhaps more so, than the old ways. More technical
aspects of enterprise such as plant size may be unamenable to
change induced by new rules, but areas subject to extensive legal
influence such as independent distribution may well be amenable
to change and to the development of alternative, but equally efficient, methods of doing business.
106. The Robinson-Patman Act was a force in causing the development of house
brands and thus adding a new dimension to mass retailing. J. PALAMOUNTAIN,
THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 159-87 (1955). The chainstore tax system was
among the factors leading to the disintegration of their formerly vertically integrated gasoline selling systems and the creation of independent distribution businesses. Id. at 187. The Sherman Act makes price fixing unlawful and so encourages product differentiation among those seeking monopoly profits thereby
creating more diversity in fact. The Sherman Act prohibition on monopolizing a
product line induces firms to invest monopoly profits in other activities. See
U.S.M.'s Hard Life as an Ex-Monopoly, 86 FORTUNE, Oct. 1954, at 124. This also
tends to support new product innovation and efforts to find or create new demands.
The effect of the strong rule against merger of competitors also encourages product
extension and conglomerate mergers.
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THE LAW OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS:

Vertical restraint law appears to many observers to be a hodgepodge of rules and exceptions without sound or consistent theoretical basis. Upon closer analysis, however, the rules may be much
more consistent than has been previously recognized. In order to
perceive that consistency, it is necessary to reject exclusive adherence
to any one economic perspective because the rules reflect a pragmatic formulation based on both static and dynamic policy considerations.
Although courts have been less than clear in articulating the
reasons for the rules, a review of the case law suggests that two
policies underlie the decisions. The first is a concern for efficiency
in static terms, without which a firm must inevitably fail. The
second is a concern with the power of one independent firm over
another equally independent one, a situation which has an obvious
dynamic implication for the potential for change and innovation.
The rules found in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.'0 7 and
the cases involving vertical price controls manifest an implicit
balancing between these static and dynamic interests which can
be explained in terms of a single set of criteria.

A.

The Evolution of Vertical Restraint Law:
From Cartel Hypothesis to Protection of
the Independent Business

In developing rules regarding restraints on distribution, courts
have categorized restraints according to the activity or conduct
restrained rather than looking to the function that the restraint,
regardless of form, is meant to perform. With respect to restraints
imposed in the setting of a distribution system, the courts have
developed three main categories, the first two of which are relevant
to Schwinn and this article: (I) price control; (2) nonprice controls
over the distributor's business, such as territorial or customer
control, and (3) restrictions on dealings with either other suppliers
or distributors. The third category includes a variety of "restraints"
including some tying arrangements, requirements contracts, and
full-line forcing, not all of which are necessarily based on monopolistic position, and thus do not lend themselves to this discussion.'l 8 The general conclusions advanced, however, will apply to
107.
108.

United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
The analysis of exclusive dealing or requirements contracts is difficult.
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all cases in which such restraints arise in the context of monopolistic competition.
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co.,'0 9 the
first leading case involving a vertical restraint decided by the
Supreme Court, a producer of proprietary medicines had, by contract, fixed both the prices at which its wholesalers sold Dr. Miles
medicines to the retail drug stores and the prices at which the
retailers in turn sold to the public. Having discovered that John D.
Park was obtaining and reselling supplies of Dr. Miles products at
cut rates, Miles claimed that these sales were destroying its resale
price maintenance program, thus threatening its market position.
Miles sought to enjoin Park from continuing to obtain its products
in violation of contracts. On a demurrer by Park, the trial court
dismissed and the court of appeals affirmed. l
Miles did not deny that its contracts were restraints of trade.
Rather, it tried to justify the restraints primarily on the theory that
Given a long lead time to create production capacity and/or known long run needs
for a fungible good, long term contracts may make sense to both producer and
consumer of such a commodity. Because fungible substitutes exist, such contracts
would presumably involve no more restriction on either party than was fully justified in terms of savings generated by the reduced uncertainty. See, e.g., Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); cf. United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). Such restraints may, however, also occur in
a program of monopolistic competition. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. (Calif.) v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). Because of the analytic ambiguity that this
creates, it is deemed best to exclude this area from extensive treatment in this discussion.
109. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Dr. Miles was decided during a particularly active
period of Supreme Court consideration of basic antitrust principles. Dr. Miles
was argued on January 4 and 5, 1911, while United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), was reargued on January'6, 9, 10, I1, and 12, and
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. 1 (1911), was reargued on January 12,
13, 16, and 17. Further, the decision in Dr. Miles was handed down on April 3,
1911, less than 45 days before the announcement of the Standard Oil decision and,
with two exceptions (Holmes and Lurton), all of those in the majority in Standard
Oil voted for Hughes' opinion in Dr. Miles. As a circuit court judge, Lurton, however, had written the opinion in Dr. Miles, 164 F. 804 (6th Cir. 1908), which had
followed Lurton's earlier opinion in John D. Park & Sons, Co. v. Hartman, 153
Not surprisingly,
F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907), cert. dismissed, 212 U.S. 588 (1908).
therefore, language in Dr. Miles anticipates the Standard Oil rule of reason. See
220 U.S. at 406.
110. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 164 F. 803 (6th Cir.
1908). The Supreme Court had already granted certiorari on a similar case but it
was about to become moot. See John D. Park & Sons, Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24
(6th Cir. 1907), cert. dismissed, 212 U.S. 588 (1908). Furthermore, there were apparently a large number of similar cases pending in the courts at this time.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 12, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). The prompt grant of certiorari in Dr. Miles, 212 U.S.
575 (1908), coupled with these facts may well indicate the Court's desire to resolve
the problems involved in vertical price fixing.
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any manufacturer has a legal right to restrain the pricing freedom
of its vendors."' The Court dealt with this claim in several ways.
First, relying upon ancient texts on restraints on alienation, it stated
that the right to sell or to refuse to sell did not include the right to
sell any interest less than a total one." 2 Second, the Court declined to recognize an "inherent power incident to production"
that would enable a manufacturer to announce and enforce price
or other controls over subsequent users of the property." 3 Any
such control, according to the Court, could arise only under a statute
or contract. Since no special statutory right existed, Miles' power
must perforce have arisen through a contract in restraint of trade.
Such contracts were to be tested by their "reasonableness," first
in terms of the "public interest" and second with respect to the
4
parties.'
The thrust of Miles' defense had been that the restrictions were
designed to prevent retailers, particularly department stores, from
selling at a discount. If this could not be prevented, Miles contended that
the majority of retail druggists . . . are "unwilling to, and
do not keep" [its] . . . medicines "in stock" or "if kept in
stock, do not urge or favor sales thereof, but endeavor to
foist off some similar remedy or substitute.""' 5
Justice Hughes concluded that Miles had claimed that
the advantage of established retail prices primarily concerns the dealers, the enlarged profits which would result
. . . would go to them . . . [I]t is through the inability of
the favored dealers to realize their benefits, on account of
111. Miles also argued that, since its medicines were made by secret process,
it had a right to control prices by analogy to patent holders' fights. Patent law
at this time allowed such control, see, e.g., Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186
U.S. 70 (1902), although the Supreme Court has since implicitly reversed the rule.
See Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931). Justice
Hughes rejected this argument, 220 U.S. at 401, because any such right had to
arise from a statutory grant based on public considerations.
112. Id. at 404-05. Others have questioned the accuracy and relevance of the
Court's argument. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365, 392 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
113. 220 U.S. at 407. Such a power, akin to that of a patent or copyright
holder in dealing with infringers, had even been rejected at common law. See
Anonymous---'The Schoolmaster Case," Y.B., anon. 11 Hen. IV, f. 47, pl. 21 (1410),
reprinted in M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY, & H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATIONS 42-43 (1975).
114. The Court did not find it necessary to test the reasonableness with respect
to the parties, but the opinion suggests that the key would be whether or not
there is a less restrictive alternative available. 220 U.S. at 406.
115. Id. at 375.
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the described competition, that the complainant works out
its alleged inquiry.
Justice Hughes thus read Miles as claiming nothing more than that
it was acting as an overseer for a dealer agreement to fix prices and
boycott price cutters. Justice Hughes found 7that this was not in
the public interest and thus was unreasonable.1

Justice Holmes' dissent is notable in that it laid the foundation
for the future debate over the legality of vertical restraints. First,
he pointed out that if the retailer were a consignee, no one would
deny the right of the producer-consignor to control the price at
which the retailer sold the consigned goods." 8 Moreover, Holmes

saw the majority opinion as "extending a certain conception of
public policy to a new sphere.""

9

Favoring a contrary policy of

' 20
letting "people manage their own business in their own way' 1

and believing that demand for Dr. Miles products was relatively
elastic, 12 he argued that the "Dr. Miles Medical Company knows
122
better than we do what will enable it to do the best business.'
Holmes did not respond to Hughes' analysis that Miles was operat-

ing a retailer cartel. Under Holmes' analysis, Miles was operating
in a market in which nearly perfect pure competition existed; in
the long run only a competitive price could prevail, thus making
irrelevant any concern with misguided attempts by Miles to set up a
23

cartel. 1

As a historical matter, Hughes was correct on the cartel nature
of this agreement. Only five years earlier, a druggist boycott of
116. Id.at407.
117. Since the activity thus came within the category of vertically sponsored
cartels, even the most vigorous defenders of vertical restraints would admit Miles'
contracts were illegal. Of course, Miles may have had other reasons for its vertical price controls, but if it had, it should have pleaded them. See generally Bork,
Part II.
118. 220 U.S. at 411.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 412. Holmes described Miles' products as nonessentials and from
that deduced that there would be a high level of substitution between them and
similar products based on comparative price. This would check and control any
abuses. By assuming that Miles is in perfect or nearly perfect competition, Holmes
could argue that it has no market power and thus no change in the way it sold
goods would affect that.
122. Id.
123. Holmes' assumption of something approaching perfect competition among producers of differentiated nonessentials is critical to his analysis. At the time that
Holmes wrote, economics had yet to develop a theory of product differentiation
so that rejection of his position would have had to rest on only a sense that his
model did not conform to reality.
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producers who sold to price cutters had been enjoined. 24 The
contract defended by Miles was one of twelve similar contracts
entered into almost simultaneously by major drug producers and
wholesalers following the first druggists' convention after the injunction against the druggists' boycott had been entered.1 25 This
illuminating background was not part of the formal pleadings and
was barely mentioned in the briefs. 26 Given, then, that this was a
dealer cartel and'that Miles and the other producers were rationally
run businesses, Holmes' perception of the substitutability of specific
medicines, even if justified, becomes irrelevant when the substitutes are also offering competing cartels.
In 1919, in United States v. Colgate & Co. the Court sought
to clarify the doctrine of Dr. Miles, unanimously holding that a
manufacturer could suggest retail prices and refuse to sell to distributors not honoring those prices, provided that this was not done
pursuant to an agreement. The Court declared that the Sherman
Act, absent
any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly . . . does
not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal. And,
course, he may announce in
advance
the
circumstances
under
which he will refuse to
12
deal.

1

124. Jayne v. Loder, 149 F. 21 (3d Cir. 1906).
Jayne v. Loder, cited above, was decided by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals. It was an action under the seventh section of the antitrust act
against a combination of three distinct national associations, one that of
wholesale druggists, another that of retail druggists and the Association
of Manufacturers of Proprietary Medicines. The object of the combination was to exclude every dealer from trading in proprietary medicines of
all who would not consent to sell to members of the combine only and
at prices named by it.
John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 35 (6th Cir. 1907); cf FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 36-38 (1945).
125. J. PALAMOUNTAIN, POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 94 (1955).
126. Dr. Miles referred in passing to the consent decree without discussing or
describing it. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 7, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). The only reference to the practice
of the drug producers was to point to the uniformity of their actions as evidence
of the necessity of dealing in this way. Id. at 13.
127. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
128. Id. at 307. The Court was working on the assumption that no agreement
existed in the case. In light of the facts, this seems a bit strained. The government charged that Colgate had engaged in
Distribution among dealers of letters, telegrams, circulars, and lists
showing uniform prices to be charged; urging them to adhere to such prices
and notices, stating that no sales would be made to those who did not;
requests, often complied with, for information concerning dealers who
had departed from specified prices; investigation and discovery of those
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By sqnctioning, in such unqualified terms, prior announcement
of the conditions under which a seller will deal, the Court created
an obvious tension with Dr. Miles. Recast in Colgate terms, all

that Dr. Miles Medical Company had done was "to announce ii
advance," albeit through its contracts, the terms on which it would
deal with customers. Although the Colgate opinion did not reject
the ruling in Dr. Miles, it did appear to limit application of Dr. Miles
absent a formal "combination . . . which undertook to prevent
dealers from freely exercising the right to sell."12 9 After Colgate,
it might have seemed that a firm could fix prices provided it used

announcements and other informal practices but did not use a formal
written contract.
What Colgate really did was to announce in sweeping terms the
right of a producer freely to select distributors in ways consistent
with the producer's notion of effective distribution. The Court's

next task was that of explaining and defining the limits of this
freedom. Justice McReynolds began this effort in United States
v. A. Schrader's Sons, Inc. 30 In this case, the district court
thought the sole distinction between Dr. Miles and Colgate was
the presence of a formal written contract in Dr. Miles."3' The
Supreme Court, however, pointed out that the distinction did not
rest on the mere form of the agreement. Rather, in reaffirming the
teaching of Dr. Miles that vertical price-fixing agreements were
not adhering thereto and placing their names upon "suspended lists";
requests to offending dealers for assurances and promises of future adherence to prices, which were often given; uniform refusals to sell to any who
failed to give the same; sales to those who did, similar assurances and
promises required of, and given by, other dealers, followed by sales to
them; unrestricted sales to dealers with established accounts who had observed specified prices, etc.
Id. at 303. Certainly such facts have proven sufficient in subsequent cases to sustain a case. See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
In Colgate, however, the trial court construed the indictment as not charging that
an agreement or contract existed and thus under federal law the Court was bound
by that interpretation. 250 U.S. at 301-02. See also United States v. Parke,
Davis & Co., supra.
129. 250 U.S. at 308. A minor irony in Colgate is that former Justice Hughes,
having left the Court and returned to private practice, was the chief advocate for
Colgate in the Supreme Court. Hughes' brief explained Dr. Miles as follows:
That case dealt simply with the validity of contracts by which dealers
were restrained in selling what they owned ....
The question, as the
Court said, was as to "the validity of the restrictive agreements" . ...
This Court fully recognized the right of a manufacturer to sell or not, as
he pleased ....
It was the restraint upon the right of alienation of property sold, not the right of the manufacturer to refuse to sell, that was
involved.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 24, 25, United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300 (1919).
130. 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
131. 264 F. 175 (N.D. Ohio 1919), quoted in 252 U.S. at 97.
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illegal, the Court, speaking through Justice McReynolds, limited
Colgate to the proposition that a manufacturer could unilaterally
decide on and announce its policies and could refuse to deal with
those who did not adhere to them. The Court noted that, in Colgate, it had been bound by the lower court's determination that
no agreement had been alleged. 132 Even under Colgate, a manufacturer could not enter into agreements with all its customers "which
undertake to bind them to observe fixed resale prices"1 33 and thus
"take away dealers' control of their own affairs. 1 34 The crucial
issue under both Dr. Miles and Colgate was the existence of such
an agreement.
Although the Schrader Court had mentioned that the agreement could be either express or "implied from a course of dealing
or other circumstances," 135 in Frey & Sons, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 36 the Fourth Circuit had found that the Colgate doctrine
controlled because there had been "no formal written or oral
agreement with jobbers for the maintenance of prices."'' 37 The
Supreme Court, again speaking through Justice McReynolds, rejected this interpretation in an almost summary fashion. Repeating
what had been said in Schrader, it held that the agreement could
3
and, in the instant case, should have been implied from the facts. 1
The subsequent development of the case law on vertical price controls became a matter of defining and redefining "agreement."
The Court slowly, but consistently, chipped away at the apparently
strict requirements of the original McReynolds formula. 39 But, at
least through Parke, Davis, one element that consistently existed
was some form of explicit understanding among competing dis40
tributors.1
In static terms this line of cases can be seen to rest upon a
rather uncomplicated and unsophisticated view of vertical restraints: Whqnever two or more distributors knowingly have their
freedom of action on prices restrained by "agreement," the preconditions of a distributor cartel exist, and so the restraint may be
132. 252 U.S. at 99.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 100.
135. Id. at 99.
136. 256 U.S. 208 (1921).
137. Id. at 210.
138. Id. McReynolds' subsequent dissent in FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,
257 U.S. 441, at 458 (1922), seems to turn on the failure of proof on this issue.
139. This history is set forth in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S.
29, 38-49 (1960).
140. Id. See also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 160-65 (1968) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
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concluded that the distributors were in fact agents and so could be
legally controlled in pricing as well as other aspects of their competitive conduct. 145 United States v. General Electric Co.,1 46 decided several years later, went even further in accepting any
anticompetitive arrangement as long as it was cast in the form of
an agency. In this case, the Court distinguished Dr. Miles on
grounds of little more significance than drafting error. Although
Miles had called its distributors consignment agents, the Court
found it obvious, based on the wording of the agreement, that there
had been a sale of medical products to the wholesaler. 47 General
Electric, on the" other hand, had made no such drafting error, and
therefore prevailed. It was permitted to retain its price control
48

system.1

Merely changing the form of the producer-distributor relationship from vendor-purchaser to principal-agent was, as Holmes had
noted, of great significance to the Court of the 1920's. With little
concern for the functional relationship of the parties, the Court
seemed willing to accept any restraint without inquiry into its function or purpose so long as it was cast in terms of an agency relationship. This mechanistic aproach had the effect of reducing the principles set forth in Dr. Miles to mere traps for unwary draftsmen
since economically equivalent49 transactions could be created under
either sale or agency rubrics.
The agency device thus became useful in any cartel plan. It had
the potential totally to vitiate the effectiveness of the antitrust prohibiti6ns on price fixing. A functional analysis was essential to
avoid this result.
The first major case to employ a functional analysis involved a
horizontal price-fixing scheme under cover of an agency distribu-

145. Id. at 581-82. Chief Justice Taft, with whom Brandeis concurred, wrote a
separate opinion expressing doubt as to the majority's conclusion that the Court
did not need to remand the case to the FTC for further fact findings with respect
to the existence of an agency relationship. Id. at 582. But even they seem to
have accepted the idea that a lawful agency would end the inquiry:
146. 272 U.S. 476 (1926). GE made large numbers of retail stores its "agents"
for the purpose of selling light bulbs sent on "consignment." These descriptions,
while legally correct, were not functionally very accurate.
147. Id. at 486. Although the Court's opinion in Dr. Miles had formally
avoided deciding that issue, the resolution was sufficiently clear that this rewriting
does no violence to the opinion. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 396-400 (1911).
148. 272 U.S. at 488.
149. Whatever the parties call a transaction, the use of appropriate contract
terms can reallocate risks and responsibilities in any way the draftsmen desire. See
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280 (1942).
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held per se unlawful. Despite the recognition in Colgate that a
producer can have a substantial, if not dominant, interest in the
conduct of distribution, the probability of horizontal motivation was
sufficiently great to preclude inquiry into the reasons for and purposes of anything defined as an "agreement." The negative implication is that any "restraint" not involving "agreement" is likely
to be ancillary to some producer interest and reasonable so that it
is per se lawful.
There is, however, a second strand in these cases which suggests that the independence of distributors and producers is an
important factor in the Court's analysis. This emerged most
clearly in the Albrecht case.' 4' There the plaintiff did not claim
any agreement among competitors but instead focused on agreements among the defendant and others whose purpose was to influence and control plaintiffs prices; nevertheless, the Court decreed
that the defendant had violated the antitrust laws in its effort to
restrain plaintiffs conduct. Justice Harlan's dissent appears to
argue that the proper reading of the prior cases is that the definition of agreement was to serve the purpose of differentiating between lawful restraints based on producer efficiency interests and
unlawful ones based on cartel motivation. He then argues that the
Albrecht facts involved restraints that were clearly of efficiency
origin. While the majority suggests that even these restraints
could be part of a cartel package, they do not argue that the cartel
inference is the more compelling. The real thrust of the opinion
is that the scheme "intrude[s] upon the ability of buyers to compete
and survive in that market."' 42 After Albrecht it is clear that considerations beyond eliminating cartels lay behind the judicial hostility toward vertical restraints. The basis of this attitude would
seem to lie in a perception of the market as dynamic and the general
effect of vertical restraints as being adverse to desirable dynamic
characteristics of the market.
,
In Dr. Miles, Holmes had suggested that the easy solution for
a manufacturer was to recast the transaction in such a way as to
make the "reseller" an .agent. 4 3 The first case which presented'
the agency defdnse was FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co. 44 The FTC
challenged Curtis' practice of employing large numbers of formerly
independent magazine distributors as its "exclusive" agents serving
assigned territories and charging specified prices. The majority
141. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
142. Id. at 152, 153. See also id.at 151 n.7, 154.
143.' Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911).
144. 260 U.S. 568 (1923).

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND SCHWINN

1976]

tion. In United States v. Masonite Corp., 50° the producer, who held a
patent for the manufacture of fiberboard, was able to get other
producers of the product to sign agency distribution contracts which,
among other things, gave Masonite the power to fix prices.'15 The
presence of strong horizontal overtones made it especially easy for
the Court to reject the agency idea as justifying the elimination of'
competition by "competitors" of the producer through an arrangement, the purpose of which was "to fix prices at which the competitors may market the product."' 52 The Court, refusing "to allow the
form into which the parties chose to cast the transaction to govern," 153 distinguished between permissible and impermissible restraints on the basis of the functional character of the distributor
upon whom the restraints were imposed. "[I]f it may fairly be
15 4
said that that distribution is part of the patentee's own business,"'
it is permissible; but where a producer
utilizes the sales organization of another business-a business
with which he has no intimate relationship-this arrangement poses quite different problems, since such a regimented marketing system is peculiarly susceptible to
55 the
restraints of trade which the Sherman Act condemns.
The Court's reasons for this conclusion heavily emphasized the
potential for competing patented, i.e., differentiated, products that
was suppressed.by the agreement.
Two decades later, the Court dealt with the issue of vertical
price restraints imposed through an agency contract in which the
horizontal conspiracy elements so obviously involved in Masonite
were less evident. In Simpson v. Union Oil Co.' 56 the Court reaffirmed the logic and conclusion in Masonite: Distribution restraints
must be viewed functionally, in terms of the nature of the parties.
Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas pointed out that the consignment device created vertical price restraints that took from the independedft distributors "[p]ractically the only power they have to be
wholly independent businessmen, whose service depends on their
own initiative and enterprise." 57 The Court again emproyed a functional rather than formal distinction between those upon whom a
producer could impose restraints and those upon whom such impo150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

316 U.S. 265 (1942).
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 279.
Id.
377 U.S. 13 (1964).
Id. at 20-21.
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sition would be illegal. Simpson's teaching was that if the distributor is functionally independent, control of his resale prices is
generally illegal regardless of whether the technical basis on which
he holds the goods is described as agency or consignment. 5 '
The applicability of this expansion of the Dr. Miles rule turned
on the definition of independent business. The Court, having opted
for a functional definition, did not, however, articulate tests by which
5
the independent distributor could be distinguished from the agent.1
The Court said only that:
Dealers, like Simpson, are independent businessmen; and
they have all or most of the indicia of entrepeneurs ....
The risk of loss of the gasoline is on them, apart from acts
of God. Their return is affected by the rise and fall in the
market price . . . [They] are in reality small struggling
competitors seeking customers. 6 °
As indicated earlier, there is a crucial distinction between functionally independent distributors, who can and do perform without the
necessity for control, and employees, whose function is defined by
the orders they get. While risk and title are relevant to an inquiry,
they are not functional tests which directly examine the roles of the
6
participants in the activity of distribution. Albrecht v. Herald Co.' 1
provided an ideal factual setting for an analysis of 'those factors
which make someone who is providing a distribution service an independent distributor, but neither side raised the question because,
ironically, the only common ground between the parties was that
those who delivered the Herald's newspapers were independent
businessmen.
Despite the absence of a clear Supreme Court definition of functionally independent businesses, lower courts have developed a
158. See United States v. General Elec. Co., 358 F. Supp. 731, 735, 736
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Rahl, Control of an Agent's Prices: The Simpson Case-A Study
in Antitrust Analysis, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1966).
159. This failure in the context of the Simpson case is understandable. The
gasoline producers had for so long promoted the idea of independent station
operators that it would hardly do for the Court to let this be denied. There are a
variety of tax, union, liability, and motivational reasons which compelled producers
to transform their original system of owned stations into leased stations. See
Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 395 F. Supp. 735 (D. Md. 1975). See
generally J. PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 106. But having done so, the teaching of
many cases is that the producers cannot then treat their former employees as if
they were still employees. See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968);
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S.
13 (1964); United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Cal.), 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
160. 377 U.S. at 20-21.
161. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
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working notion of this class or type of business. The courts appear
to consider a number of factual elements as indicia of the independent businessman but have not fully articulated the underlying functional character which they seek to ellucidate1 62 Perhaps the
clearest example of such a distributor is found in United States v.
General Electric Co., 63 decided in 1973, which finally struck down
GE's agency distribution system. The GE system employed as
agents primarily retail grocery, hardware, and drug stores and industrial and electrical supply houses.164 Such businesses are usually
owner-initiated and owner-financed, supply fnore in the way of goods
and services than merely GE products, do their own billing, collections, and hiring, and make final sales on their own initiative. Their
contracts with GE were, nevertheless, "genuine contracts of agency
under private contract law." 65 The court had no trouble finding
162.
istics:

A careful analysis of the cases in this area yields the following character-

(1) The independent businessman bears the risk of loss, his income
arising from the difference between what he pays the producer and what
he charges his customers. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 20
(1964); Knuton v. Daily Review, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1974);
Lepore v. New York News, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See
also Fagan v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 303 F. Supp.. 356 (S.D. Ill. 1969)
(agent assumes no risk).
(2) The independent businessman's. contract with the producer will
often stipulate that he is not an employee or agent, but rather an independent contractor. See. e.g., Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 383 F. Supp.
1346 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Lepore v. New York News,. Inc., 346 F. Supp. 755
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
(3) The independent businessman will usually have his own capital
invested in both the goods and the equipment necessary to distribute
them. See, d.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("He purchased his route for $11,000 receiving a
list of subscribers, a used truck, and a newspaper-tying machine."); cf.
Ammerman v. Bestline Prods., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
(4) The independent businessman provides a variety of services which
may include, in addition to selling the product, delivery of the product,
billing and collections, and recruitment or hiring of personnel. See, e.g.,
Lepore v. New York News, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); cf.
Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (in this
refusal-to-deal case, the aggrieved independent dealers also distributed
other publications); Fagan v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 303 F. Supp. 356
(S.D. Ill. 1969) (agent only solicited orders).
(5) The independent businessman will usually have the power to
consummate a sale without further producer approval. -See, e.g., Simpson
v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Lepore v. New York News, Inc., 346
F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); cf. Fagan v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 303 F.
Supp. 356 (S.D. Ill. 1969) (no such power in agent).
163. 358 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), consent decree entered, 1971-I Trade Cas.
74,942. For an independent dealer with whom producer has refused to deal, see
Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 651, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also
RahI, supra note 158, at n.26.
164. 358 F. Supp. at 734.
165. Id.
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that the "agents" were independent businesses for antitrust purposes. 166
Taken as a whole the cases on vertical price control reflect a
more complex, if not clearly intelligible, set of rules than the term per
se would appear to convey. Thus, producer control of prices set by
functionally independent distributori- is condemned whenever it is
done by "agreement."
Colgate recognizes a producer interest in
distributor pricing sufficient to justify cancellation of a distributor's
franchise without antitrust liability provided that cancellation is not
done by way or in pursuit of an "agreement." 167 Moreover, the
implicit teaching of Simpson is that while a producer can not disguise its functionally independent distributors as agents and then
control their conduct, it is free to use such controls whenever the
distributor is not functionally independent. Therefore, to the extent that a producer has the choice between agents or employees
and functionally independent distribution, it can select the degree of
control it wishes by judicious selection of the functional character of
the medium through which it operates. A line emerges from these
cases which looks to the functional character of the distributor subject to control and establishes zones in which conduct otherwise
apparently similar in purpose and effect is labelled either per se
illegal or per se legal.
Cases involving nonprice, vertical restraints are generally a
more recent occurrence. Although the early vertical price cases
usually included customer and territorial controls, 68 the only early
Supreme Court case in which territorial and customer restraints were
predominant was Curtis Publishing.169 In this case the FTC had
charged Curtis with seeking to foreclose magazine distribution by
causing many formerly independent dealers to become its agents
and, as agents, agree not to distribute other magazines. 70 The
Court sanctioned the restraints as necessary and reasonable incidences of the agency employment agreements of which they were a
part. This decision came in the mid-1920's, a time when judicial
enthusiasm for strict antitrust rules was at an alltime lOW;17 1 its broad
166. Id. at 736.
167. Dart Drug Corp. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 221 F. Supp. 948 (D.D.C. 1963),
aff d, 344 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1965); cf.Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car
Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
168. This was usually in conjunction with resale price maintenance. See, e.g.,
United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 481-83 (1926); Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 375-83 (1911) (customer restraints).
169. FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923).
170. Id. at 574.
171. In 1923 the Court handed down a number of decisions which have since
been implicitly repudiated. Compare FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463
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sweep may explain in part why so few nonprice vertical restraint
cases seem to exist. In the mid-1940's, when the issue of producer-imposed terfitorial or customer assignments again reached the
Court, an equally divided bench refused to reverse the lower court's
decision upholding the lawfulness of such restraints. 172 Interest in
nonprice vertical restraints reappeared about a decade later when
the Department of Justice announced that territorial restraints were

illegal per se. 173

On June 30, 1958, the government filed both the

Schwinn 174 and the White Motor complaints 175 and during this same

period some of the major merger litigation was initiated. 176 Taken
as a whole, these cases represented a broad program 177 of attack on
increased concentration through merger and on restrictive trade

practices.

Because the trial judge in White granted summary judg-

ment for the government, 178 it became the first case in which the
Supreme Court dealt at any length with nonprice vertical restraints. 79 The Supreme Court held that absent a complete record,

it could not decide whether vertical nonprice restraint was, as a
(1923) (tying of gasoline sales to low-cost lease of storage tanks held not illegal)
with FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 381 U.S. 739 (1965), and compare National Ass'n of Window
Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403 (1923) (territorial allocation sustained),
with United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972), affld on rehearing,414
U.S. 801 (1973).
172. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 728-29 (1944).
173. This declaration took the form of testimony before a congressional committee. See Hearings on Automobile Marketing Legislation Before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 89,
362 (1955). The government obtained a number of consent decrees in line with this
position. See United States v. Bostitch, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas.
69,207 (D.R.I.
1958); United States v. American Type Founders Co., 1958 Trade Cas.
69,065
(D.N.J. 1958); United States v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 1958 Trade Cas.
69,011
(W.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp., 1958 Trade
Cas. 68,957 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v. J.P. Seeburg Corp., 1957 Trade Cas.
68,613 (N.D. Il. 1957); United States v. AMI Inc., 1957 Trade Cas. I 68,758 (W.D.
Mich. 1957); United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 Trade Cas.
68,409 (E.D. Pa.
1956). See also Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of
Goods, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 254, 265 n.82 (1959).
174. United Stateg v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill.- 1965).
175. United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
176. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), was filed Nov. 28,
1955. FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967), started on Sept. 30, 1957;
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964), had started on July
22, 1957.
177. Indeed, the program laid out in Thurman Arnold's The Bottlenecks of Business, stripped of its labor union.component, is the outline of the program initiated
under the Eisenhower administration in the 1950's. See T. ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS 240-59 (1940). Although it did not bear foi'mal legal fruit until
the Kennedy-Johnson era, it did result in some voluntary charges and consent de178. United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562, 587-88 (N.D. Ohio
1961).
179. United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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general matter, good or bad and so could not say whether a per se
rule was in order. It therefore remanded the case for a full trial
although the opinion failed to instruct the trial court as to what information it should collect.180 The Court did not say that vertical
restraints were to be judged by a rule of reason; it only said it
did not know what standard to employ.' 8 ' The Court, however,
did seem implicitly to assume that, given a fully litigated record, it
could decree the per se unlawfulness of territorial or customer restraints for all future cases.12
The result in White Motor was an invitation to the lower courts
to make open-ended examinations of the facts and claims of both
sides in vertical nonprice distribution cases. Lower courts read the
opinion as implying that if a producer could show appropriate justification for the nonprice restraint on its distributors, the restraints
could be lawful. Since any producer of a differentiated product
dealing with and through independent distributors has an obviously
substantial interest in the distribution process and since the producer usually introduces vertical restraints in the stated belief that they
will further its business interests so that the restraints fit the efficiency explanation for vertical restraints, it is not surprising that
such defenses were presented successfully in a number of leading
cases over the following several years."'
By not following the rules of vertical price restraints in White
Motors, the Court gave the impression that there was some significant difference between vertical price and nonprice restraints.
Otherwise, as Justice Clark pointed out in his dissent, the case
should have been governed by the same rules that applied to vertical
price fixing, i.e., Dr. Miles and the per se rule. 8 4 However, a persistent insistence on differentiating price control from other controls
on competition makes no sense. While a price-fixing agreement
180. Id. at 263. Brennan's concurrence does not solve this problem; it focuses on
the problem of when restraint may be reasonable in a specific case and not the
legislative problem of when in general the practice will be prohibited. See id.
at 264-75.
181. Id. at 262-64. Douglas' opinion is very explicit on this point, but it is
ultimately consistent with the argument that vertical restraints involve a category of
law in which presumptive lawfulness or unlawfulness can be decreed if sufficient
information is available.
182. The Court was not to have the opportunity in this case, however, as White
Motors immediately entered into a consent decree giving the government most of the
relief it had sought. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 1964 Trade Cas.
71,195.
183. See, e.g., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools
Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
184. See United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 275-83.
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may strike at the vital center of a selling relationship,1 85 all of these
restraints are part of a single class of conduct and are substitutable
in many cases.18 6 To the extent that territories and customers are
assigned to each participant in an agreement, the need for price
fixing can be reduced or eliminated since there will be no competitive selling effort if each seller has his "dancing partners."
A restraint, whatever its form, is just that: a restriction on the
seller's (or buyer's) freedom of action which will affect competition
and the price of goods directly or indirectly; it can make little
policy sense to say that businesses cannot agree tonere:satraint_but
that they can agree to another which is functionally the same. The
iules established for comparable restraints ought to yield consistent
results. If there is not at least this level of consistency, then the
rules are absurd and can serve no policy function except charade.
Thus, the White Motors - Dr. Miles tension had to be resolved one
way or the other: vertical restraints were to be appraised either
under a rule of reason or resort was to be had to a per se rule.
The Supreme Cotlrt's clarification began with the General
Motors case in 1966.187 There, a district court had dismissed the
government's challenge to General Motors' efforts to keep its dealers
from reselling to discount houses. The Court recast the evidence in
such a way that it appeared that GM dealers and their association
had coerced GM (actually "requested" jointly and individually that
GM adhere to its dealer agreements) into refusing to deal with the
nonconforming dealers. To the Court this conduct fit the case into
the mold of the traditional boycott cases 8 8 and so made the practice illegal. The Court relied heavily on Parke, Davis89 in support of its argument that this was not a unilateral refusal to deal on
the part of GM. But in doing all this, the Court ignored the produce's _efficiency -interest -in control over distribution which it had
recognized in White Motor. Indeed, White Motor was not referred
to at all in the opinion; yet GM's location assignments and its
insistence that each dealer perform only at its assigned location
would seem, under White Motor, to have called either for a rule of
185.

See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-24 (1940).

186. There is recognition of this truism in Schwinn and in the writings of commentators, see, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379
(1967); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions,
75 CoLum. L. REv. 282, 298 (1975); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 278-80 (1975). See also Bork, Part II.
187. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
188. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959):
Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
189. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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reason analysis as to the validity of these quasi-territorial assignments or for a declaration that this form of vertical restraint was unlawful per se. If location clauses were valid, then so long as GM
itself was enforcing them in the interest of the efficient distribution of
its differentiated product, its conduct would seem to have been reasonable absent a specific showing to the contrary. In ignoring this
aspect of the case,' 90 the Court can be said to have reversed White
Motor sub silentio.
When Schwinn' 91 finally reached the Supreme Court in 1967,
there had been four years of experience with the White approach,
and the tension between it and the rules on vertical price fixing were
becoming obvious.
The facts appeared to be that Schwinn faced a declining market
position in the early 1950's due in substantial measure to the competitive pressure from the mass merchandisers. 92 As Justice
Stewart explained in his partially-concurring opinion, Schwinn decided to reorganize its distribution system selecting a limited number
of retailers with special and specific characteristics in the belief that
Proper promotion of its products required an active and
stable dealer organization, composed of experienced people
who could properly promote, assemble and service bicycles.
Such dealers were to be found primarily in small independent bicycle sales and repair shops rather than hardware
stores or mass merchandisers that sold bicycles unassembled in the carton and provided no service and repair
facilities.93
In order to achieve that goal, Schwinn prohibited any of its retailers from selling to anyone other than a final customer. Like
Miles, a half-century earlier, Schwinn did not want its dealers to
have to compete with anyone other than those to whom Schwinn had
and again like Miles,
chosen to sell its products. Morently,
Schwinn faced the problem of how to get its products to the selected
retailers. This was a task which involved serving many small outlets all over the country. It was apparently not something which
Schwinn could do exclusively with its own employees. Ultimately,
Schwinn developed four plans of distribution: the Schwinn plan, an
agency plan, a consignment plan, and sales to distributors subject to
restrictions on resale. In each case the plan required that some ser190. General Motors' brief did rely on White Motor to justify its conduct, so the
issue was presented to the Court. See Respondent's Brief at 7, 12, 23, United States
v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
191. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
192. See id. at 368-69.
193. Id. at 383 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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vices of a middleman be used in reaching the retailer. Restraints
were employed in each of these plans to insure that only those retailers that Schwinn had selected received its product.
Under the Schwinn Plan, the "distributor," for a fee, booked
orders from franchised Schwinn dealers and relayed those orders to
Schwinn; Schwinn shipped directly to the .retailer and billed it
directly. 94 Under this plan, Schwinn controlled the final sale and
could reject buyers of which it did not approve.
Under the agency plan the "distributor" was a warehouseman
leasing storage space to Schwinn and shipping goods from that inventory to any retailer which Schwinn had authorized to order bikes.
Schwinn billed the95retailers and the distributor collected a fee for the
1
services rendered.
Under the consignment plan, the distributor received a supply of
Schwinn bikes to which Schwinn retained title and assumed certain
risks and responsibilities for so long as those bikes remained at the
distributor's warehouse. The distributor was only to deliver the
bikes to approved retailers, meaning Schwinn franchisees, in the
distributor's territory. But when the distributor took a bike and
shipped it, he paid all expenses of the transaction, billed the retailer
directly (apparently taking the risk of nonpayment), and remitted to
Schwinn only the net amount that Schwinn required, keeping
the
196
difference as compensation for his various efforts and profits.
Finally Schwinn would sell bikes outright to the distributor and
the distributor would resell them to retailers. In this type of transaction, title would pass to the distributor who would assume more
risks, although some risk presumably did remain with Schwinn as,
for example, with respect to defective bikes which could probably be
returned. Schwinn required that the distributor agree to limit its
sales to those dealers which Schwinn had decided ought to retail
Schwinn bikes in the territory that Schwinn assigned to the distributor. 197 There was no fixed price imposed on the distributor; but
this is probably explained by the existence of the Schwinn and
agency plans in which Schwinn retained price-setting control that
maintained an effective maximum price and by the use of exclusive
territories that eliminated the risk of competitive price cutting among
distributors.
The government saw the Schwinn case as one in which Schwinn
194. See Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L.
REV. 595, 606-07 (1968). The article was written by one of the defense counsel for
Schwinn.
195. Id. at 607.
196. Id. at 606-08.
197. U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 371 (1967).
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dealt in several ways with functionally independent wholesalers and
retailers.198 In its original formulation the government charged that
there were price-fixing agreements as well as customer and territorial allocations. Under the government theory, the several distribution plans would then be alternative policing devices which insured
that each distributor would adhere to the overall market allocation
plan. In essence, then, the government's approach was to cast
Schwinn as the administrator of a distributor cartel. This theory, if
adopted, would require that all of Schwinn's controls over its wholesalers and distributors be eliminated and that the forms of the transactions be recast as the sale to the independent distributors that
they would have been had there been no need to police the cartel.
Schwinn, taking its lead from White Motor, argued that there was
no price control and, more importantly, that the restraints were reasonably necessary to its continued viability as a competitor in a world
of mass merchandisers. Thus Schwinn lumped all of its restraints
together under the efficiency rubric. The four plans, as well as the
restraints on retailers, were all necessary ingredients in functionally
similar operations: each plan of distribution was designed to serve
the same function, i.e., to get the bikes to the retailers, and the retailer restraint was designed to keep the retailer from becoming a
distributor by reselling to other retailers. From its perspective,
Schwinn did not see any reason to regard the plans as distinguishable.
The district court found no price fixing but did find unlawful the
territorial restraint on resale by distributors of bikes they had purchased. The court did, however, uphold the customer restraints with
respect to both the distributors and the retailers. It also upheld as
reasonable all restraints on distributors who were operating under
the Schwinn, agency, or consignment plans. The judge regarded the
activity of the distributor in these roles as being akin to that of an employee or agent under the control of the producer.' 99
On appeal the government did not challenge the price fixing
findings. Instead, it focused its arguments first on the customer and
territorial assignments, contending that the partial outlawing of the
territorial and customer restraints made no sense and thus the restraints should be held illegal in their entirety. Secondly, the government renewed its argument, based on the implicit cartel theory,
198. See Brief for the United States, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. 365 (1967), excerpts reprinted in R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC
NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 266-72 (1974).
Posner, himself, participated in
preparing this brief and argued the case for the United States.
199. 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
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that the several forms of distribution were- similar and that it made
no sense to forbid control with respect to bikes purchased while allowing it with respect to those distributed under the Schwinn,
agency, and consignment plans. Schwinn defended those restraints
sustained by the trial court as reasonably incident to its distribution
program in order to achieve efficiency through effective control over
the participants.
The Supreme Court agreed with the government that no restraint
on territories or customers was permissible where the distributor or
retailer was a buyer of the bikes. Such control was per se illegal.200
But the government failed to persuade the Court that the nonsale
forms of distribution were mere shams, presumably because the
efficiency explanation for the overall scheme seemed more plausible
than the cartel explanation.
As a result the Court declined to-treat these restraints as per se
unlawful. Having concluded that the distributors were in fact "indistinguishable in function from agents or salesmen, ' 20' it invoked a
rule of reason and found that the restraints were reasonable. In
reaching this conclusion the Court cited four factors: substitutes
were available for both retailers and wholesalers; both distributors
and retailers handled other bicycles;, there was no price fixing to
taint the case; and competition made necessary the challenged proitself went no further than required. by competitive
gram which
20 2
pressure.
Moreover, with resplect to, its per se rules, the Court was very
clear that they were not absolute. "[I]t is unreasonable without more
for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons
with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has
parted with dominion over it. ", 20 3 Thus. a manufacturer may apparently
-

reserve control over [a product's] destiny or the conditions
of its resale . . . in an appropriate and impelling competitive setting. . . . [W]e are not prepared to introduce the
inflexibility which a per se rule might bring were it applied
to prohibit all vertical restrictions of territory . . . . Such
a rule might severely hamper smaller enterprise resorting
to reasonable methods of meeting the competition of
204
giants.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

388 U.S. at 382.
Id. at 381.
Id.
Id. at 379.
Id.
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The point of this passage is not clear. While it certainly means
that restraints over non-functionally independent distributors is permissible, it probably also means that some forms of vertical restraint may be lawful in an "impelling" circumstance, even if there
is a sale. Consistent with this mandate, the ultimate decree in the
case allowed Schwinn to continue to use territorial allocation in the
form of areas of primary responsibility and to refuse to deal with
25
any distributor which failed to perform its responsibility.
In any event, in Schwinn the rules governing nonprice restraints
achieved rough congruence with the rules governing resale price
controls. To have adopted any other approach could have led only
to demonstrably inconsistent treatment of fundamentally similar
restraints resulting from a formalistic rather than functional classification of restraints.20 6 As the case law now stands, with respect to
dealings between two functionally independent firms, it is usually
lawful to suggest resale prices, 207 assign territories or customers as
areas of primary responsibility, 203 and require that a distributor
selling to unauthorized customers pay some portion of the revenue
from those sales to the firm to which that customer was assigned.20 9
But it is usually per se unlawful to agree to adhere to a price list 2 0
2
2
or agree not to sell to customers in certain areas 11 or categories .
Moreover, if the controlled distributor is not functionally independent, then, in general, control is lawful unless its effects are unreasonable. These rules have been greatly criticized 2 3 both because
205. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 1968 Trade Cas. 72,480 (N.D.
Ill.
1968). The decree was entered by consent of all parties.
206. Cf. Kalven, Tort Watch, 34 AM. TRIAL LAWYER'S L.J. 1, 31 (1972) ("The
role of logic in law is to iron out the small contradictions, the big ones we leave
alone.")
207. See, e.g., United States v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 303 F. Supp. 141 (D.D.C.
1969).
208. See, e.g., Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied,411 U.S. 987 (1973).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, 1973-1 Trade Cas.
74,485
(N.D. Ill.), decree aff'd, 414 U.S. 801 (1973).
210. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911); United States v. General Elec. Co., 358 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
211. See, e.g., Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080, 1084
(7th Cir. 1970); Todhunter Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 610,
modified, 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Ammerman v. Bestline Prods., Inc., 352
F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
212. See, e.g., Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 432 F.2d 1080,
1085 (7th Cir. 1970); Ammerman v. Bestline Prods., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.
Wis. 1973); Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711, 720 (S.D.N.Y.), affld,
417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969).
213. The critics of the rules include a large number of private litigators and, of
course, cases such as Schwinn arise in substantial part because well-counseled cor-
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they appear to make the passing of title a crucial element in distinguishing between per se unlawful and reasonable restraints and
because even within the per se category the exact form of the restraint appears to determine whether it is per se illegal.
In order to explain the nature and meaning of the rules on vertical restraints and to lay the foundation for a consistent policy upon
which to base these rules, it is first necessary to explore the use of
the per se and rule-of-reason categories in antitrust case law, especially as these categories are employed in cases involving arguably
ancillary, i.e., efficiency, restraints such as those in the Schwinn case.
B. Ancillary Restraints and the Per Se Rules: A
Theory of Presumptive Illegality
Although the Sherman Act purports to outlaw "every contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce," 21 4 a literal reading of this broad language has long been
recognized as ill-suited to the needs of a competitive marketplace.
A per se prohibition of all agreements that have the effect of restraining trade would prohibit many necessary contracts. Thus, as
Professor Bork pointed out:
The per se concept does not accurately describe the law
relating to agreements eliminating competition as it is, as it
has been, or as it ever can be. Alongside cases announcing
a sweeping per se formulation of the law there has always
existed a line of cases refusing to apply it. . . The persistent refusal of courts to honor the literal terms of the per se
rules against price-fixing and market-division agreements
demonstrates a deep seated though somewhat inarticulate
215
sense that those rules, as usually stated, are inadequate.
The distinction between naked and ancillary restraints provides
the point of departure for this explanation.21 6
A naked restraint is one which is valuable and valued for itself,
i.e., for the direct effect on competition which it produces. An
porate defendants believe that the adjustments which they would be forced to make
under a consent decree are so costly as to justify the costs of litigation.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
215. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division (Part1),
74 YALE L. J. 775, 777 (1965).
216. This has not, however, been recognized in many cases. See, e.g., Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). See also White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-62 (1972); M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY
& H. GOLDSCHMIDT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 331-34
(1975). The most general explanation runs in terms of some sort of evaluation of
the purpose and effect of the restraint. See Northern P. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1958).
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ancillary restraint, as the name implies, is one necessarily incidental
to. the achievement of some other productive goal. In terms of the
prior explanations for vertical restraints, a restraint explained in
cartel terms is a naked restraint while one explained in efficiency
terms is an ancillary one.
Any restraint may have desirable consequences in a particular
case; but the per se approach specifically rejects the admission of
evidence of such consequences.217 In Trenton Potteries218 the Court
held illegal a price-fixing scheme without reference to its reasonableness. Justice Stone, writing for the Court, started with the proposition that a restraint "is the elimination of one form of competition"
and "involves power to control the market," and "agreements which
create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves
unreasonable without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed., 219 There were
already some cases in which the Court had made such an inquiry and.
there were others in which it had not. The problem was to sort
the cases and decide when restraints "may well be held . . . in
themselves to be unreasonable." The defendants in Trenton Potteries were understood to contend that their agreements were for the
purpose of producing a reasonable price and that this was the only
object or goal of their activities. This was therefore a naked restraint. The only possible test of reasonableness of such a restraint
is the desirability of the specific result, but "the reasonable price
fixed today may through economic and business changes become the
unreasonable price of tomorrow . . . . Moreover . . . we should
hesitate to . . . make . . . the difference between legal and illegal
depend upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are reasonable. 220
Thus, the argument is two-fold. First, the changing nature of
supply and demand makes any determination of reasonable price a
very impermanent decision. More importantly, given the role of
price specifically and competition generally in adjusting supply and
demand, there is no logically consistent test for reasonableness in
these matters except as a result of market interaction. Any attempt
to create a naked restraint is both evidence of power to control a
market (for such a restraint only has effect if there is market control)
and proof that any consequences cannot be tested by any logically
217. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 397.
220. Id. at 397-98.
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consistent standard; as a result such a restraint ought always and
without exception be held illegal. This total prohibition of naked
restraints puts the Sherman Act in accord with at least one view of
the common law's attitude toward restraints.221 With very few exceptions, none of which has had continuing vitality, all cases involving naked restraints have been condemned in the Supreme Court
without reference to the reasonableness of the results achieved by
the restraint.
The basis for the categorical rejection of restraints because of the
impossibility of logically determining whether specific prices are
"reasonable" does not, however, extend to cases where a logical and
consistent standard can be employed. When the basic asserted
benefit of a restraint comes from a transaction or activity other than
the restraint itself, and the restraint has only made possible or facilitated that benefit, it is then feasible to examine the restraint in
of
light of the need for it, and ask whether it is reasonable in terms 222
facilitating the transaction or activity to which it is an incident.
The issue in such a case is the reasonable necessity for the power
created by the restraint in terms of the benefit obtained and not the
reasonableness as such of the specific price or other restrictive action.
If one takes a static view of the economic world, then evaluation
of the relationship between the restraint and the benefit in terms of
the necessity of the first for the full achievement of the second determines reasonableness.223 This analysis suggests that three tests
must be applied to the restraint: (1) is joint activity necessary to]
achieve the primary benefit; (2) is the restraint reasonably necessary to the efficient conduct of the beneficial activity, i.e., is it reasonably related to achieving the primary benefit sought; (3) are there
less restrictive alternatives which could achieve the same benefit?/
The first two tests are primarily directed at whether the restraint is
truly ancillary, while the third directs the inquiry towards whether
the purpose behind its imposition was really effectuation of the joint
activity. If a restraint fails any of these tests, it is unreasonable.
221. Bork, supra note 215, at 783-85.
222. This test is found in common law restraint cases and was early said to be
applicable in antitrust analysis. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.
271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898), afl'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See also Bork, supra note 215, at
799-801, 829-32.
223. This is the approach used by Justice Hughes in Dr. Miles, but it will be recalled that he rejected the restraint because of its injury to the public interest, not
its disutility in achieving its end. This is logical and consistent with the analysis
presented here if we assume that Miles, in Hughes' view, had created a cartel, i.e.,
that the restraint was naked and so on its face objectionable.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:771

The agreements to which a restraint can be ancillary may involve
either a single sale or a joint venture. The essential characteristic is
that the transaction is adversely affected by the absence of some ob224
ligation on the part of parties affecting their competitive freedom.
In the classic case of the sale of a business, the buyer wishes to have
a reasonable opportunity to obtain the goodwill of customers and establish his capacity to serve them as satisfactorily as the seller. If
there is a risk that the seller of a business may reopen a similar
business in the same area, the buyer may immediately discount the
price of the business with the good faith seller getting less for it. To
insure that the buyer gets what he wants and that the seller gets the
full value of what he sells the buyer may ask for an agreement not to
compete for a reasonable time in a specified area. This example
illustrates some of the difficult problems in ancillary analysis. For
example, what is a reasonable time depends primarily on what we
define as the seller's transferable interests. If we define the transferable right as one limited to a chance to compete without the
threat of a specially advantaged competitor during a period of entry
and establishment, then the restraint can be weighed. What makes
this example difficult is that it involves some transfer of monopoly
power. 22' The amount and type of such power that can permissibly
be transferred must be narrowly circumscribed.
The ancillarity issue arises only when there is some integration or
interaction between the parties and can arise in both vertical 226 and
horizontal 221 contexts. The common characteristic of the cases is
224. An agreement on price is, for example, a necessary incident in any bargained
sale; but, it is also essential to the full completion of the transaction and so -is in a
sense an ancillary restraint. Of course, the restraint is so essential that, absent other
factors, we would not regard it as a restraint. But if it covers many potentially
separate sales, it can be called a requirements contract, or tie-in, or exclusive dealing
arrangement.
225. The restraint is only necessary in the context of a differentiated demand
which is being transferred from buyer to seller. When a farmer sells his wheat farm,
for example, no covenant would make sense.
226. These are the cases in which the joint venture produces aft input or provides
a service for or acts as marketing agent for the participants. See, e.g., Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
227. For example, United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), is
horizontal in the sense that both participants were potential competitors of the joint
venturer but served different markets. The proper way to look at such activity is
under standards applicable to mergers and not as "per se" restraints. Compare
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965) (opinion on
remand) with United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. at 177 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). If, however, the joint venture does the same thing as the participants
and does it in the same market, a justification is implausible unless the joint venture
is in the form of a merger, which is the usual way such ventures are cast. The
horizontal merger and monopoly cases where the monopoly is a product of acquisition
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the need to spell out the relationships among the participants. There
are two leading cases involving reasonable restraints. In Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States225 an allegedly illegal price-fixing
agreement was found to be reasonable because of its importance in
maintaining the integrity of the Board of Trade, a joint venture
among grain dealers for the purpose of providing a market for futures. In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,2 29 the joint
venture among coal producers for the purpose of providing a common selling agent was found reasonable despite the fact that it
minimized price competition. The underlying theory in both cases
seemed to be that the restraints were necessary to the functioning
of the joint venture. This approach is clearly illustrated by Associated Press.230 The Court addressed the question of whether the
membership rule in issue. was reasonable as an incident of a joint
venture t6 produce news and not whether AP could have rules
which would serve to exclude some papers, thus creating a boycott.231 Implicitly, the Court sustained AP's general right to boycott
for good cause.232
The cases thus support the conclusion that ancillarity is a necessary condition before a rule of reason can apply. But a showing of
ancillarity is not always sufficient to trigger a full rule of reason
inquiry. Thus, where a sale is conditioned on the purchase of another good, i.e., a tie-in arrangement, there is an ancillarity argument
that the restraint is incidental to the sale of the tying good, but in
Northern Pacific tie-ins were clearly labeled per se 'illegal.233 In
another well-known case, Topco sold brand name goods to its member owners for resale, limiting the territory in which each member
could resell. This restraint was at least arguably incidental to the
involve cases in which there is a joint venture, if you will, which controls the former
participants, but it might be justified by showing the necessity of the combination to
achieve some economy or efficiency. This defense in practice is limited to the failingcompany cases. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
228. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
229. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
230. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
231. Id. at 14. The opinion makes clear that reasonable restraints on membership would be lawful. Id. at 13-14.
232. Such a notion is unthinkable in the per se boycott restraint situation. See,
e.g., Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
233. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). See also Fortner
Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); United States v.
Loew's, Inc., 371 -U.S. 38 (1962). For an economic analysis of tie-ins see Bowman,
Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Markovits,
Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397 (1967). For a
fuller legal discussion see Ross, The Single Product Issue in Antitrust Tying: A
FunctionalApproach, 1974 EMoRy L.J. 963 (1974).
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joint venture which created Topco and called
into being the Topco
23 4
brands, but it was declared per se illegal.
That these latter cases- proceed on a different basis from those
where restraint is naked is manifest. Thus, despite the strictures on
the evil of tie-ins, in Northern Pacific and subsequent decisions some
tie-ins have been sustained.235 The Supreme Court, even as it has
formulated its condemnation, has recognized and allowed these exceptions. 236 In Topco, having declared that territorial division is per
se unlawful, a conclusion which would seem to apply to any division
of territory however formulated, the Supreme Court sustained a decree which allowed Topco to assign territories and require any member which goes into the territory of another to assess against the
entering member charges for losses suffered by the firm whose
territory was entered.237
If per se rules are viewed as absolutely precluding any defense,
then these cases present analytical difficulties.- If territorial restraints
were governed by a per se rule, how could a lower court consider
the arguments advanced to justify the modified restraints imposed by
Topco after the Supreme Court's apparently unequivocal ruling? If
tying arrangements are naked restraints and per se illegal, how is it
possible to entertain a new entrant defense, as in Jerrold ElectroniCs? 23 8 The critical difference between these and naked restraints is
that these restraints are at least arguably ancillary to .some other
activity or transaction. However strongly such a restraint may be
condemned in general,' the courts 'do recognize that narrowly circumscribed situations arise in which its use is justified. Nevertheless, the rules announced in these cases are put in terms of per se
illegality. These cases do demonstrate that ancillarity is not itself
always sufficient to bring on a full-scale rule-of-reason inquiry.
Thus, the per se rules of antitrust cover two categories of cases.
The first category consists of those cases involving naked restraints.
Such a restraint can only be justified in terms of its benefit as a
restraint; once identified, it is always illegal per se in the absence of
specific legislation declaring when and under what conditions such
restraints are reasonable. 239 The second class includes those cases
234. United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 496 (1972).
235. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), affidper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
236. See, e.g., id.
237. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 414 U.S. 801, aff'g per curiam,
1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,485 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
238. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'dper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
239. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1970) (governing insurance cartels); 49 U.S.C.
§ 5(b) (1970) (legalizing railroad price-fixing agreements).
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in which a restraint is part of a package of relationships and is at
least arguably ancillary or incidental to the main purpose of that
package. These restraints may be quite justifiable under a fuil
rule-of-reason inquiry but, due to the great burden that they impose
or to the excessive power that they create, they are denied rule-ofreason treatment. Unlike the rules denying rule-of-reason treatment
to naked restraints, however, the per se rules governing these types
of restraints allow limited defenses in which the reasonableness of
the restraint can be presented.240
To label both those rules that govern certain classes of ancillary
restraints and those that apply to naked restraints as per se rules is
confusing and misleading. It serves only to confuse cases which are
in fact treated in analytically quite different manners. This leads
courts and commentators, after fruitless attempts at reconciling
them, into thinking that the antitrust rules are more irrational than
they are.24 ' It would be preferable for the courts, when faced with
those situations involving ancillarity but in which fairly rigid rules
are desirable, to adopt a category of presumptively unreasonable
restraints. In this category the ways in which the presumption can
be rebutted would be limited and clear. Naked restraint cases in
which no defense is possible once the operational facts are established could be more easily distinguished, in the minds of judges
and commentators, from cases in which some rule-of-reason inquiry
may, in fact, be dllowed.
The so-called per se rules on vertical restraints are classic
examples of rules creating presumptively unreasonable restraints.
What has emerged most clearly from Schwinn, but also from the
cases generally, is a set of rules which tells courts when certain
restraints shall be presumed to be unreasonable unless the defendant
raises certain specific defenses and when the restraints shall be
presumed reasonable unless the plaintiff rebuts the presumption by a
showing that the effects of the restraints are in fact undesirable.
240. A good way to distinguish naked restraint cases from those ,under this
second category is to look to the relief to be given. If the relief is simply an end to
the restrictive practice, the case involves a naked restraint. If the relief involves
reformulating the restraint so as to limit its terms or impact, the case involves an
ancillary restraint. This test, however, will not always be dispositive. In the information-exchange cases such as United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S.
333 (1969), the issue is whether there is a restraint on competition that is part of the
information exchange or ancillary to it. In these cases, it may be necessary to define
in a decree what is permissible, i.e., nonrestrictive conduct, and what is impermissible,
Le., restrictive conduct.
241. See, e.g., Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court:An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions,
75 CoLuM. L. REv.282, 283-90 (1975).
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If we assume that these rules are intended to include ancillary
restraints, this suggests that even an ancillary restraint which passes
the three tests of reasonableness and is therefore the minimum necessary to achieve the desired benefit is nonetheless objectionable
because it is deemed too harmful to long run competitive interests
when compared to the benefit that it produces. This is a dynamic
economic inquiry. If it results in a determination that a particular
restraint is so objectionable, the logical result should be general
illegality for that restraint, except where its effects are not deemed
harmful either because the undesirable result is unlikely or because
of the character of the parties benefiting from the restraint.
In static terms there are also possible reasons for such a.strict
view of certain arguably ancillary restraints. It is possible that the
apparent joint venture is but a cover for the market-allocating or
price-fixing activity purportedly incident to it. Having reached that
general conclusion, a court could justify severely limiting its iiquiry
unless some relevant defense were presented, e.g., the failing-company defense. Secondly, if a full rule-of-reason inquiry were generally available upon a claim of ancillarity, the litigation process would
be greatly delayed and complicated; this is especially likely if the
origin of a restraint is at all ambiguous. A third reason for such
rules is that once the courts have considered the general case for a
restraint and evaluated the general argument which justifies its use
as an incident to some other activity, they may be able to fqrmulate
guidelines in the form of per se rules for other courts as to the
merits of the defense, thus greatly simplifying resolution of subsequent cases.

C. The Economic Theory Behind the Rules of
Presumptive Illegality: The Static and Dynamic Bases
The question thus becomes to what extent, if at all, do the rules
on vertical restraints reflect dynamic economic consideration and to
what extent are they grounded on the static theory, simply seeking
to facilitate the distinction between cartel- and efficiency-based restraints.
The hypothesis that would emerge from an application of the
static analysis is that courts tend to believe that, whenever there is
a showing that two or more distributors have a similar understanding
of the restraints that exist on their competition inter se, they are
part of a cartel and that the proper response is to dissolve it. This
would, of course, explain why some courts insist on evidence of ac-
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242
tive enforcement of the territorial limits before finding illegality,
since such evidence might be thought to support the inference of
243
Conversely, this would mean that
producer as cartel promoter.
unilateral commands to dealers and commands which varied from
dealer to dealer ought generally to be accepted as, valid.244 The
cases in general comport with static theory if one accepts a broad
definition of vidence of cartel. Moreover, if these cases are cartel

cases, then they are properly disposed of on a per se approach, even'
under Bork's analysis.
The cartel explanation was a critical factor in Dr. Miles. Miles
asserted that it could get favorable treatment for its products only
if it could reassure competitors which would handle them that there
would be a price fix on the products; that is, Miles had to create and*

police its own cartel. By. viewing a producer as a promoter of the
cartel, the case creates horizontal conspiracy. All of the subsequent
leading cases .xcept Albrecht245 have some element showing that
more than one reseller was aware of the restraint and stood to

gain something from its enforcement. While it is demonstrable that
the rationalization for the rule against price fixing varied in the
cases,2 46 the common factual setting of horizontal understanding was

also present from which one can argue that it was this fact that controlled.
Under this approach, if the restraint is associated with a new
242. See, e.g., Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973).
243. Of course, this evidence would. also be consistent with an ancillary restraint
aimed at avoiding free-rider problems.
244. Such personalized restraints are not usually the subject of litigation, but
when they are, the verdict is usually for the defendant. See, e.g., Weather Wise Co. v.
Aeroquip (;orp., 468 F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 990 (1973);
Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 377 F. Supp. 418 (C.D.
Cal. 1974); Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co., 316.F. Supp. 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1970),
affd, 451 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922 (1972); Top-All Varieties,
Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); E.A. Weinel Constr.
Co. v. Mueller Co., 289 F. Supp. 293b(E.D. Ill. 1968). If, however, the restraint was
the product of group pressure, it will probably be struck down. See, e.g., United
States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); American Motor Inns, Inc. v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1073 (D.N.J. 1973), af/id in part andrev'd in part,
521 F.2d 1230 (2d Cir. 1975).
245. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), may be an exception, since
the maximum fixed price did not appear to be a joint distributor interest. Each
distributor did, however, have an exclusive territory and price control. In the context
of the partially monopolistic market of a daily newspaper, the maximum price may be
viewed as an element of a cartel for dealers (submonopolists) that requires them to
limit their monopolistic exploitations in order to gain admittance to the cartel. It is, of
course, in the producer's interest to minimize that exploitation, so maximum price
may only be the producer's condition for policing the cartel.
246. See Posner, supra note 241.
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entry, then the premise that the restraint involves the creation and
maintenance of a cartel is called into doubt. Thus a rule of presumptive illegality based on the inference of a cartel should not ap247
ply. In Sandura,
where the defendant demonstrated that it had
created new distributors and did not work with established ones, the
court sustained the restraint. Similarly, the Snap-on Tools 248 decision is consistent with the argument that the parties demonstrated
that their restraint did not operate horizontally.
What, then, can be said about Schwinn? The focus of the government's factual claims was a territorial allocation of customers
among four distributors. 249 By emphasizing that these firms
engaged in selling bicycles and that their existence was independent
of Schwinn, it is possible to argue that Schwinn was administering a
market allocation plan for the benefit of those firms. The customer
restraints imposed both on distributors and retailers can fit a cartel
theory, but the fit is very poor, and certainly the result of allowing
customer controls when the distributor is acting as an agent suggests
that the Court did not perceive the issue of cartel as a central one.
In this analysis the decision in White Motor becomes not an effort
to revise the law but a recognition that Bork's position on the facts is
valid: not all vertically imposed restraints will look unilateral, and
the defendants should have greater scope to demonstrate that a restraint is purely vertical. Schwinn in this reading becomes a testimony to the failure of counsel on both sides to convince.25 °
Such an analysis, however, does violence to the view stated in
many cases that purely, i.e., non-cartel inspired, vertical restraints
are illegal. Thus in the post-Dr. Miles price-fixing cases, the unwillingness to consider the possibility that the restraint was purely
vertical, once it was shown to exist, or to ask for any showing that
the restraint might facilitate a cartel arrangement suggests that
courts did not see the cartel issue as central. If they had, they could
have said so directly and greatly focused the inquiry in subsequent
cases. Moreover, the relief accorded in the cases, especially
Schwinn and Topco, suggests that the courts did not see simple naked
restraints under fancy covers. There is a clear effort to preserve the
covers in part which is not consistent with a cartel-naked restraint
247. Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1964).
248. Snap-on Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
249. Brief for Appellant at 12-20, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967).
250. Had the government convinced the Court, then the entire system of control
should have been dismantled as the conclusive manifestation of a cartel; and if
Schwinn counsel had been convincing, then nothing should have been done because
the restraints were efficiency-justified.
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analysis. Thus while the static model of per se lawfulness of ancillary vertical restraints might be more useful in explaining court action than the language of the decisions often suggests, it is not fully
explanatory of the results. Nor is static theory totally explanatory
of the factors at play in a producer's decisionmaking process. Although every firm must be aware of its present situation in the
market, it must also consider its growth and progress over time. It
must plan not only for today's efficiency but for tomorrow's change.
And, although an economist can afford to presume that technology
or demand are constant, a firm in the real world cannot. In fact,
if there is a certainty in the business world, it is that the economic
environment is dynamic, that technology and demand will change.
This is the subject of dynamic theory and policy discussed earlier.
The very indefiniteness of dynamic theory, however, makes recognition of its invocation and application much harder. Still, beginning with Dr. Miles, there is a sense that the Supreme Court is
not unaware of this dynamic quality of business life.
In Dr. Miles, the producer gave as a reason for specifying prices
a desire to control and eliminate price cutting by department stores
and cut-rate drug stores 251 which had taken a different approach to
retail distribution, emphasizing price discounts instead of personal
service. Miles clearly wished to keep from stimulating a new and
more powerful class of retailers more able than individual drugstores
to find and promote alternatives. Miles also asserted that if existing resellers of its products were subjected to competition, some of
those sellers would find other products to promote. Behind this
claim presumably lurked the fear that there might be new entry at
the producer level if the existing sellers became dissatisfied.
Thus, the complaint can be read as impliedly charging that one
of the goals of the Miles restraints was to retard any change in the
present scheme of production and distribution which would work to
the disadvantage of Miles and its existing distribution system.
Viewed in this light Miles was asserting its right, via agreements
with other independent businesses, to restrict and control new, alternative forms of competition that presented threats to its existing
market power. While the pleadings certainly present dynamic
251.
[C]ertain retil establishments, particularly those known as department
stores, had inaugurated a "cut-rate" or "cut-price" system, which had
caused "much confusion, trouble, damage" to the complainant's business
.; this injury resuted "from the fact that the majority of retail druggists
as a rule cannot, or believe they cannot, realize sufficient profits."
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373, 374-75 (1911).
The implication is clear that the new forms of competition threatened existing
competitors.
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issues, the majority opinion fails to advert to them in any recognizable manner. Since a dynamic analysis would have led to the
same result, however, its absence is understandable.2 52
The Colgate decision 253 can also be cast as a dynamic problem:
development and implementation of new distribution techniques.
Unless a producer can develop new ways to distribute and solicit
new distributors who are willing to try the new technique, as well as
to eliminate undesirable distributors, the producer's ability to cope
with a changing world is greatly circumscribed. As defined and
modified in subsequent cases, the Colgate doctrine has primarily
dynamic meaning: protecting producers in their efforts to find new
and more efficient distributors. The source of dynamic change in
distribution rests in the functionally independent businessman
whether as merchant for soaps or as discount department store.
This is no more than the received tradition of economics.254 The
entrepreneur, the person who combines labor, land, and capital to
create the productive firm, is the independent businessman. Later
theorists have suggested that even he can be hired or that many
businessmen are not truly entrepreneurs in the special sense of perceiving and creating new businesses. 255 But, if one accepts traditional perceptions, it was the independent businessman who did
these things. A set of rules based on the dynamic value of change
and innovation with respect to some activities would put greater
store in the preservation of such independence of those elements
functionally independent with respect to that activity than in the
independence of mere agents or employees.
In the 1920's the Court explicitly recognized the dynamic nature
of the economy in explaining why naked restraints should be per se
252. Holmes' dissent focused specifically on the static issue of efficient production
and did not address this broader formulation. I would suspect that it drew such
limited support in part because it ignored the dynamic issues. Holmes could answer
that a new system of distribution will come into being whenever it is sufficiently
attractive for this to happen. Such an analysis denies that restrictive agreements
create barriers to entry. Since an element of Miles' case was that these restraints
were supposed to have just-that effect, it is somewhat inconsistent to say that Miles
is rational and irrational at the same time. It can be said that such restraints are
unlikely to bar any substantially more efficient system and that, whatever dynamic
goal might exist, its achievement is unlikely if the alternative is very attractive. This
is a kind of deterministic response, but even in those terms if the new system is not
much more efficient, especially at the outset, then, at least as to marginal experiments,
strong support for existing restraints would retard or defeat efficient dynamic change.
Those devices, which substantially retard freedom to innovate, are also objectionable
if one is less deterministic about the economic environment on the basis that they deny
a free choice among alternatives.
253. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
254. See 1 A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 291-313 (9th ed. 1961).
255. Cf. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 619-20 (9th ed. 1973).
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illegal.25 6 A couple of years earlier in the GE case the Court had
sanctioned a detailed restrictive distribution system which utilized
an agency-consignment system. 257 ' While the GE case can be explained on patent grounds, the Court's rationale had more'to do with
distribution generally. Taken together with FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co.,25 8 the GE case suggests a perception of agents as the kin
of employees, to be controlled and directed. These cases are consistent with Dr. Miles and Colgate if the categories of employee/
agents and independent businessmen are perceived as functionally
different. In the dynamic view, which focuses on functionally
independent businesses,, the difference is significant: independent
businesses can innovate and are dynamic (they are self-propelled)
while agents have no similar attributes with respect to the overall
distribution process. Consequently, control of them is always permitted both as part of a static efficiency-promoting program and as a
way to provide for dynamic change.
The subsequent reduction of the scope of the agency defense is
understandable primarily in terms of an altered, or perhaps more
precise, perception of sources of dynamic change. As the Court saw
genuinely independent businesses being controlled and directed by
the use of consignments, it realized that the label did not always
comport with the reality of the functions performed by the purported
agent. For example, after transforming gas station attendants into
independent businessmen, the oil refiners then sought to control
them as if they were still employees by use of the consignment device. 259 And so in the Simpson case, the Court rejected price
control even though the goods were on consignment since the consignees were held out and appeared to function as independent
256. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
The aim and result of every pricefixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix
arbitrary and unreasonabhe prices. The reasonable price fixed today may
through economic and business changes become the unreasonable price
of tomorrow. Once established, it may be maintained unchanged because
of the absence of competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which create such potential power may
well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable
or unreasonable as fixed, and without placing on the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether
it has become unreasonable thrbugh the mere variation of economic conditions.

Id. at 397-98.
257. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
25e. 260 U.S. 568 (1923).

259. See Standard Oil Co. (Cal.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); cf. J.
PALAMOUNTAIN, THE POLITICS OF DISTRIB:UTION (1955).
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The opinion would exempt a case in which a seller

only uses one or, at most, very few consignees. The seller in such
a situation is by implication not a substantial factor in any market
and therefore, under a dynamic rationale, has a greater right to try

to acquire market power by use of controls over others in the distribution process.
A recurring note in many of the per se cases which involve rules
of presumptive illegality is the exception for new or failing firms.
The idea that such firms may legally make use of tying,26' vertical
territorial allocation,262 or other restrictive devices makes very limited
sense in static terms. If it is efficient for firms to use restraints, there
is no good reason to limit the use of efficiency-producing devices to
a small class of firms that are, in some respects, the least likely to
make efficient and productive use of this right. Such a distinction is
at best arbitrary and, on static grounds, not justified. But if, as

appears in dicta in the Brown- Shoe merger case,263 the Court's
presumption is that these restraints are devices for dynamic change
in market power over time, it can be argued that the Court, in the
interests of a dynamic economy, has sought to authorize the class
of competitors most in need of and most likely to advance positive
dynamic interests to use devices otherwise impermissible to create
or increase their market power.
In general one can discern a concern not with static efficiency but
rather with promoting change in the marketplace. The key to
change is the preservation of the free alienability of power. This
260. There is, however, some basis in the cases for the proposition that change
from manager to lessee operator does indeed alter the conduct of those operating a
station. See, e.g., Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Co., 395 F. Supp. 735 (D. Md.
1975).
261. See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), afjfdper ciriam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
262. Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); cf. Packard Motor Car Co.
v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
263.
Thus, unless the tying device is employed by a small company in an attempt
to break into a market, cf. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047,
1066, the use of the tying device can rarely be harmonized with the strictures
of the antitrust laws . . . . Similar considerations are pertinent to a judgment under § 7 of the Act.
The importance whih Congress attached to economic purpose is
further demonstrated by the Senate and House Reports on H.R. 2734,
which evince an intention to preserve the "failing company" doctrine of International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n., 280 U.S. 291. Similarly,
Congress foresaw that the merger of two large companies or a large and
a small company might violate the Clayton Act while the merger of two
small companies might not, although the share of the market foreclosed be
identical, if the purpose of the small companies is to enable them in combination to compete with larger corporations dominating the market.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 37 U.S. 294, 330-31 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
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is achieved by rules of the sort found in Schwinn and vertical restraint law generally, which make continued control over independent businesses for any reason illegal unless it is justified in specific
ways.
Although one can largely explain the basis for the rules of presumptive illegality in terms of either static or dynamic theory, the
weight of evidence is that dynamic concerns do in fact underlie the
rules adopted by the Court. Keynes has said, "In the long run, we
are all dead."264 For the firm, this translates into the proposition
that unless the firm is sufficiently profitable in the short run, which
implies reasonable efficiency in terms of the world at the moment,
there will be no long run dynamic future. Thus, a set of antitrust
rules cannot rest entirely on a dynamic theory. Any policy basis
for these rules must therefore account for and respect the interest
in static efficiency as well as dynamic change.
D.

The Static-Dynamic Synthesis: Schwinn and the
Vertical Restraint Rules

A description of the policy behind vertical restraint law must
look to a balance between static and dynamic considerations. Only
after one has recognized that the Court is in fact balancing these
two perspectives and articulating a set of rules reflecting that
balance can one find any logic in the results of the cases.
In trying to strike this balance, the Court has to face difficult
problems. Primarily, how is it to separate illegal naked restraints
from reasonable, lawful ancillary ones, and thereby allow for a
proper recognition of both the substantial static interest of the producer and distributor in the efficient operation of the distribution
process and the dynamic interest in preserving the freedom of the
participants to innovate, to redistribute market power, and generally to keep distribution from becoming too rigid. As developed
earlier, recognition of a dynamic economic world also implies recognition that restraints, even vertical ones, may be power-creating
as well as efficient, and so may include certain cartel characteristics.
This in turn means that no easy separation between cartel and efficiency restraints is possible, and that any restraint may have powercreating potential which in dynamic terms may be objectionable.
This process of balancing, moreover, must occur in a context of
monopoly because none of the restraints on resale can exist in its
absence. This means that the dynamic choices to be made also
264. J. KEYNES, Tract on Monetary Reform, in 5
MAYNARD KEYNES

6 (1971).

COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN
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involve choices of more or less product differentiation with its resulting monopoly potential. The choice is real and relevant only
if the world is in fact not- determined by conditions beyond the
influence of our legal system. Finally, the Supreme Court, in
selecting rules, confronts a judiciary with a static orientation that,
frequently, is understandably, but regrettably, unwilling to face the
fact that law has a .dynamic effect upon a nondeterministic society
and economy. This means that whatever balance is struck, lower
court judges will tilt toward static efficiency. Anticipation of this
predictable response may explain the apparently strict form of
many of the resulting rules. But such rules, seeming on their face
to deny the relevance of important facts, serve perhaps to reinforce
the belief that the Supreme Court knows not whereof it speaks.
Approaching fhe economy as an area in which, at least over
time, the most efficient solutions are not always determined and
beyond control, but rather may well respond to altered legal environments, one can use both static and dynamic elements to postulate three criteria which provide a policy basis for the observable
rules of vertical restraint law. The first criterion is that no purely
cartel-based restraints are always unlawful. This criterion relies
heavily on the static equilibrium economic analysis described earlier
in this paper but it does not contradict any reasonable dynamic
policy interest and so is consistent with both. For reasons already
discussed, such restraints can, in static terms, only be inefficient.
Though perhaps more justifiable in dynamic terms, an evaluation
of that justification, especially the question of how much restraint
for how long, is not really a very practical possibility. Although
the rules themselves do not separate naked from ancillary restraints
overtly, the application of the criterion emerges in terms of relief.
If there is a solely naked restraint, the only possible relief will be
an absolute prohibition.
The second criterion is a primarily dynamic one, directed at
those restraints potentially justified by efficiency which have escaped
condemnation under the first criterion. Because of their adverse
impact on the dynamic flexibility of participants, such restraints
will not, in general, be accepted unless the participants either are
in the class of new and failing firms to which more power should
flow, or are not functionally independent within the distribution
process. The freedom to control those participants who are not
functionally independent recognizes the dynamic change and static
efficiency in making possible the use of alternatives other than
functionally independent entities. Once that right is recognized,
as it must be in any complex economy, the right to exercise con-
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trol follows from the inherent nature of the relationship. The significant portion of the criterion is its general command that no
control is permissible when the entities are functionally independent unless one or both are new or failing firms. In terms of fulfilling the overall function of distribution, the independent and
nonindependent entities can play identical roles, so that this criterion cuts as deeply as possible into the general potential for
control that might otherwise exist in order to provide the maximum freedom of action for dynamically relevant classes of business.
An added justification for the differing treatment accorded functionally independent distributors and nonindependent ones is that
in the latter case the prospect of a cartel is substantially less.
The second criterion operates on a strong presumption against
a deterministic view of the world by implicitly asserting that static
interests in efficiency can always be served in other ways, whether
by no restraint or by use of nonindependent entities. This is balanced by a third criterion primarily static in character that allows
restraints even on independent entities, but only when there is no
apparent way to avoid a problem except by restraint, i.e., when
the restraint is essential to the existence of the business in the way
that a price fix between buyer and seller is essential to almost any
sale. Requiring this "impelling" circumstance directs inquiry toward the necessity of using control. Only when direct control is
the only feasible way to protect a relevant interest of the producer
is it permitted. For example, if -no products liability insurance
existed and a product created substantial, unavoidable risks of
injury in the hands of some classes of customers, it might be reasonable to restrict the distributors' right to sell to such buyers.
If, however, insurance could be had to protect the producer that
would allow the distributor who would pay the insurance costs to
sell to any customer, making the use of a restraint would no longer
be necessary. It should be emphasized that this final criterion
is not satisfied by mere efficiency; that a control may at some point
in time produce greater sales and lower costs does not justify it.
Only a more fundamental or inherent necessity of a long run nature
will justify the use of such a restraint, and then only the minimum
consistent with this necessity.
Criteria of this sort are critical in explaining cases such as
Schwinn. There, for example, vertical restraints were imposed in
an effort to restructure a distribution system and not primarily to
create a cartel. The government's position that this was a cartel
would have required treating all four methods of distribution alike.
In refusing to do so, the courts clearly concluded that Schwinn
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had demonstrated that its restraints did not violate the first criterion. Nevertheless, the Schwinn Court drew a line that placed
some restraints in a category of per se illegality while permitting
as reasonable other restraints whose effect in terms of distribution was virtually identical. This distinction cannot be based on
cartel analysis, but rather must be explained in terms of the relationship between the producer and the restrained party.265 Such
a distinction is explicable in terms of the second criterion, which
would justify treating functionally independent elements differently.
Further, the Court set forth certain circumstances in which the producer could impose restraints even on functionally independent
businesses. These exceptions reflect both the application of the
other side of the dynamic aspect of the second criterion and the
static interest recognized by the third criterion.
There are a couple of disconcerting aspects to the Schwinn
opinion. The Court's reference to the absence of price fixing on
the part of Schwinn regarding the Schwinn Plan and the agency
sales2 66 is without rational basis, since Schwinn had total control
over the price charged to the buyer. Even more disconcerting is
the treatment of the consignment plan. The Court treated this
latter plan as a variant of the agency sales arrangement and
Schwinn Plan rather than a variant of full sale. 67 In doing this,
the Court made no functional analysis of the necessity for a control
relationship between producer and distributor. Since the distributor itself shipped these bikes to retailers and billed them, remitting only a net sum to Schwinn, it was acting in a functionally independent way requiring no commands from Schwinn to activate
the transaction. The result is perhaps a legacy of the tests of
title and risk invoked in Simpson which did not, it should be recalled, really test for functional control. It also appears that neither
the government nor Schwinn, because of the ways each viewed the
case, argued for this separation or otherwise facilitated the Court's
understanding of the varied control relationships inherent in the
distribution system. Given the overall result in the case and assuming the continued validity of Simpson, the best explanation of
the treatment of the consignments is that the Court erred in applying its standards and would not have reached the same result if the
consignment method had been properly argued.268
265. "[T]he position and function of the dealer in question are, in fact, indistinguishable from those of an agent or salesman of the manufacturer." United States
v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 380.
266. Id. at 373, 380-81.
267. Id. at 380-82.
268. The reference to Simpson in the Schwinn opinion refers to all three non-sale
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Schwinn had aimed its primary argument at the first criterion,
as had the government, and Schwinn clearly prevailed on that
point. Schwinn also sought to deal with the second criterion by
fitting itself into the class of powerless firms entitled to use ancillary restraints to achieve power in the marketplace. Here, Schwinn
failed to convince the Court that it was a new entrant or a failing
firm although it did show that its adoption of the present system
stemmed from a desire to avoid a perceived threat of possible failure.26 9 This was not sufficient to justify exempting its conduct from
the general rule, at least where it had long since made the transition to its new system of distribution. The facts clearly disclosed
that it had achieved a considerable degree of success in meeting
the large chainstore competition. Since it had already obtained this
degree of power, the unfettered right to maintain all controls would
serve more to protect and entrench its power than to permit it to
increase power at the expense of larger competitors. As a result,
actual control over the resale of bikes sold to firms acting as distributors could not be justified on the basis that it had dynamic
advantages in the long run struggle for power in the market.
Schwinn could still argue under the third criterion that control
over sales was essential. As to retail sales, since Schwinn could
dismiss the retailer altogether, it had no absolute need for detailed
control of its business. As for distribution to retailers, the existence
of the Schwinn and the agency plans made a defense of direct
control over sales very difficult. Schwinn already had two ways to
sell to retailers which did not require restraints on functionally independent distributors. Its only argument for control was that it
would keep independent distribution identical with its controlled
distribution, an argument not of necessity but of convenience.
Thus, the Schwinn case, itself a distillation and recapitulation
of the rules on vertical restraints found in the price-fixing cases,
can be explained in large measure by use of a combination of
static and dynamic economic theories, which, if they are valid,
provide a logical basis for those rules. The one thing that ought
to emerge above all else is that the policy basis is a complex one
which will not always yield easy results.
distribution plns collectively and asserts that in all these plans the "position and
functions of the dealer . . . are . . . indistinguishable from those of an agent or
salesman." In such a case only if the impact is "'unreasonably' restrictive"--which
must mean more control than is inherently needed in terms of the dependent form
chosen-is there a violation. The cite to Simpson follows. It appears that the Court
meant to show by this reference that even agency could be abused, thus reinforcing
the present argument that had the misuse of the consignment plan been disclosed, it
would have been enjoined. Id. at 380.
269. Id. at 368-77.
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To illustrate further the application of the criteria, consider the
analysis they would generate in primary responsibility clauses and
location clauses. Both can be defended on their efficiency or powercreating basis, thus meeting the first criterion if there is no cartel
coloration. But such claims are available only if those using or
benefiting from the restraint are new entrants or failing - firms,
firms to which power should flow because of weak market position. In general, the second criterion would reject these restraints;
they can only be justified if they are permitted under the third criterion: restraints inherently necessary.
The area of primary responsibility is more easily defended on
the basis of the third criterion. If its function is limited to a declaration of the area in which the distributor will devote a certain
quantum of effort, both parties must have an expression of this
idea so that each knows what is expected in order to continue the
relationship and to plan effectively. The producer must know, in
order to plan his future need for distributors, where and to what
extent his goods are presently being distributed. The distributor, on
the other hand, needs to know what is expected of him if the relationship is to continue. Of course, if in fact the areas of primary
responsibility are also areas of exclusive responsibility, the agreement is more than that which is inherently necessary to the planning of distribution and so could fail under the third criterion.
Thus, it is only the basic assignment which is permissible. It follows that a producer can require a distributor to perform within the
area assigned, and dismiss it if it has failed to perform, but it may
not have similar control, direct or indirect, over specific activity beyond that area. There is an exception here because a producer must have some freedom to select distributors so that it can
be free to remove a distributor selling outside an assigned territory
provided its reasons relate to the manner of selling and service
and not the area in which sales are made. Needless to say, this
may not be an easy distinction to make in specific cases.
Location clauses, as distinct from area assignments, create a
more disparate analysis under the necessity criterion. If a distributor already doing business at a specified assigned location adds
another location, it interferes with the producer's control over
where and by whom its product is to be sold, thus potentially
disrupting the producer's plan of distribution that is presumably designed to produce maximum efficiency. On the other hand, such a
clause is a serious imposition on the distributor's ability to develop
its business in what it regards as a rational manner. The dynamic
effect of these clauses may be to keep the distributor from becom-

1976]

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND SCHWINN

ing sufficiently powerful to consider integration backward into production, using house brands, or otherwise attempting to shift
economic power from the production to the distribution sector.
Thus, the clauses have strong efficiency arguments for them but
strong dynamic arguments against them. The real question, however, is whether they are necessary to a distribution system. The
answer would appear to be that they are not.
The location clause, like the exclusive territory clause, contains
two commands: (1) One shall serve at a given location, and (2)
one shall not serve at any other. A necessity justification is primarily served by the first command, since the producer needs to
know where the distributor will operate at any time in order to
know where to direct promotion, ship goods, and the like. Moreover a producer, given a set of existing outlets, will solicit new
distributors based on its idea of where its outlets are. Thus, in
terms of a potential new entrant into distribution, this aspect of
the location clause serves to say where the producer wants an outlet. This information is basic to business planning. The second
command centers on the producer's extensive control over the distributor's decisions about how and where to run its business.
While such control may result in more efficient distribution, it is
not essential to business relations between producer and distributor
and indeed results in substantial impairment of the dynamic character of the distributor. Moreover, if, on balance, a producer finds
it does not approve of its distributor's added locations and finds it
undesirable to continue to deal, it is free, even without the location
clause, to stop dealing. The conclusion that follows is that location clauses should be held "per se" illegal only when they go beyond telling a distributor where, at a minimum, it must sell and,
instead, attempt to delineate the totality of locations at which it may
resell a producer's products. Of course, a rigid location clause
may well be protected by a showing that the producer or a distributor is a new or failing firm if restraint has been used in a noncartel way. This is only available, however, for so long as is reasonably necessary to let the firm achieve a position of some strength
and stability in the market.
Despite the previously expressed view that the absolute location
clause fails under the necessity test of the third criterion, it should
be emphasized that this may depend on how costly it appears to be
to forbid the use of the clause. If a court perceives the problems
and costs as too great, either in general or in a specific case, it will
be included to find that the restraint is inherently essential. This
illustrates that the second and third criteria exist in a state of ten-
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sion. If a court regards the world as dynamic and nondetermined,
it will be more willing to reject necessity arguments under the
third criterion. Conversely, as a court comes to believe that the
presently efficient way of doing things is the only way, it will tend
to find a greater number of restraints as inherently necessary.
Thus, both a dynamic view of the economy and a faith in the role
of law as an independent influence on the future are essential if
the tension between the two is to be resolved in favor of a competitive marketplace. The degree of belief in these two elements
270
will affect the relative impact of the second and third criteria.
IV.

THE RULES ON VERTICAL RESTRAINTS: A COMMON

SENSE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS IN A DYNAMIC,
NON-DETERMINISTIC WORLD

A central underlying issue of all antitrust law is the extent to
which the law can control economic evolution without producing
great inefficiencies. If we assume that forces beyond the control of
the legal system determine the most efficient form of industrial
organization and that this form is unique, the legal system can, at
best, play only a limited role in shaping industrial organization.
But so many of our economic relationships exist not because of
some fundamental necessity, but because the legal system has so
directed things that such a belief has little rational basis. More270. As this article was about to go to press the Ninth Circuit announced its en
bane decision in GTE Sylvania v. Continental T.V., F.2d -- , 1976-1 Trade Cas.
60848, 44 L.W. 2510, 762 TRADE REG. REP. D-l (9th Cir. April 9, 1976).

See text

accompanying notes 97-102 supra for a discussion of the 9th Circuit's first opinion
in this case. The new opinion by Judge Ely reverses the panel's decision and holds
that Sylvania's location clause must be judged under a "rule of reason" standard.
Four judges dissented in three separate opinions. The various opinions in this case
deserve much analysis, much more than is possible at this time in this article. Suffice it to say, a primary basis for the disagreement between the majority and dissenters appears to be their differing but implicit assessments of whether the location clause was efficiency-motivated or was for the purpose of creating a cartel, (i.e.,
application of the first criterion). The majority, believing that the restraint was efficiency based, rejected application of the Schwinn rule of presumptive illegality, a
conclusion rejected vigorously by the dissenters. The primary basis for the majority's
position would appear to be a falacious distinction between location restraints and
territorial assignments reminiscent of and as valid as the White Motor distinction
between vertical price and vertical territorial restraints. See text accompanying
notes 183-86 supra. In addition, the majority fairly clearly believes that the location clause in its absolute form is essential to distribution. Thus, in terms of this
article's discussion, the majority would exempt these restraints from presumptive
illegality under the third criterion. Because Judge Ely does not separate the location clause into its two commands and does not explain how each command operates in an ancillary way essential to the survival of distribution, he does not seem
to make a convincing case for his position in terms of the analysis of Schwinn
offered in this article. Cf text accompanying notes 100, 222-23 supra.

1976"]

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND SCHWINN

over, though the inventiveness of man is vast, necessity channels
and directs it; it is the law and its sanctions that, to a large extent,
create the necessity.
The price system plays a significant role in identifying aspects
of commerce that deserve the attention of innovative minds. To
the extent that costs change, innovation aims to reduce them again.
If this means vertical integration instead of independent distribution, that result is acceptable both because it is unlikely to be more
costly27' and because the would-be distributor will be able to find a
place for his talents in some other area of distribution where genuinely independent distribution is possible. As a method of allocating scarce talent among activities, a legal system operating as a
dynamic force creates the necessity that directs this resource toward
those areas in which the greatest results are possible.
Consider how this approach deals with the problem that the
Court faces in the area of vertical restraints. First, there is the
ambiguity inherent in trying to separate naked and ancillary restraints in a dynamic world. The pleadings in Dr. Miles show that
what one person might label "cost of promotion" or "advertising
expenses" 272 that should be protected in the interest of efficiency,
a less sanguine mind could describe as a cash offer to join or to
help create a cartel. This is, of course, a form of cartel in which
competition is possible.273 Other sellers of brand name goods could
offer to give larger shares to the retail cartel, driving up the price
paid by the public to obtain seller loyalty. Such reverse competition,
even if possible, is hardly desirable. Nor is it any particular saving grace to say that this kind of activity is likely to be self-destructive over time as inflated retail profits produce more new entries at
the retail level or induce existing retailers to compete.274 By forbidding the practice in the first place, the Court avoids all the social costs involved.
271. It is worth noting that both White Motor Co. and Schwinn were in the process of moving toward greater vertical ownership and control over distribution.
White, even as it argued its case, was the owner of over half its retail outlets, and
Schwinn distributed most bicycles through its Schwinn and agency plans, not through
functionally independent distributors.
272. See Bork, Part H at 430-39, 453-56, 460-61.
273. This is the way in which Holmes' dissent in Dr. Miles makes most sense.
274. Such competitive response will depend on both entry conditions for new
firms and the degree to which existing firms do not share the agreed goals. Because
of the specific regulatory-type barriers to entry into retail drugs and the consistently
greater homogeneity of the bulk of participants, an industry drive toward cartel was
a more generally accepted goal and disruption from new forces more easily controlled than in the retail grocery industry where noneconomic barriers to entry were
less and the diversity of businesses made uniformity of ambition less possible.
J. PALAMOUNTAIN, THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 92-106, 255-62 (1955).
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If cartels should be forbidden, however, it is first necessary to
identify them, and this is difficult. McReynolds' effort in Colgate
to redirect and clarify the Dr. Miles rule illustrates the problem of
separating naked and ancillary restraints with a simple test. This
difficulty, combined with a sense that many vertical restraint cases
ultimately involve naked restraints concealed in ancillary clothing, justifies a strict view of all such restraints. Moreover, given
some respect for the inability or unwillingness of counsel to reveal
or courts to divine the true reason for a business practice, this
approach may be more than justified.
But at least since the Colgate decision, the Court has recognized
that producers have interests in all aspects of the distribution process including price. The interest is, in static terms, efficiency,
and in dynamic terms, flexibility. To accommodate the producer's
legitimate interests, the Court has elaborated on an idea which began in Dr. Miles, was developed in GE, and found final expression
in Schwinn. If substantial control is essential in the view of the
producer generally, the producer must choose as its distributive entities those types which inherently must be controlled. Control of
these entities can, indeed must, be full and complete. But they
must be genuine employees, agencies, or contractors, not independent elements in the distribution chain concealed under agency
trappings. Both Simpson and the final result of General Electric's
agency plan 27 5 demonstrate that a functionally independent distributor cannot be converted into a controlled agent merely by rewriting a contract. That aside, the Court's approach recognizes
the basic difference between an independent distributor and an
employee or contractor-agent as a functional difference and allows
control only to the extent that the entity's functioning requires the
control. As noted earlier, this is the maximum prohibition on control that the Court could write, and, while it can look strange (as
in the Schwinn case where depending on its functional relationship
with the "distributor" Schwinn can or cannot tell that "distributor"
to whom it may sell), this functional approach solves the problems
that inhere in setting policy in a dynamic area of commercial
activity such as distribution.
The functional approach facilitates the resolution of the staticdynamic tension. If the goal is to maximize the flexibility that
permits the introduction of new ways of doing business, the obvious solution is to protect the freedom of the independent elements in the distribution process so that each is free to compete
and change. This approach requires recognition, however, that
275.

United States v. General Elec. Co., 358 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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the producer must be as free to integrate vertically as the independent distributor is free not to. By keeping businesses which

are functionally independent elements in the production-distribution process free to act as they see fit, the prospect for keeping
the cost of change low is maximized. By allowing such independent

businesses at each level of distribution to decide what makes most
sense to them in price, territory, etc., the chances for the fullest

exploration of the greatest number of options are also maximized.
Hence, restrictions on the exercise of independent business judgment should be limited to those which are absolutely necessary
to the continuing relationships between such enterprises.

In permitting full control of an agent, employee, or contractor,
the Court has provided an alternative for those who cannot

operate in the free atmosphere of independent distribution, forcing producers and distributors alike to make choices.

The recur-

ring battle in the gasoline business, for example, in which producers seek to retain, for some purposes, employee-like controls
over dealers whom, for other purposes, they regard as independent
businessmen, is illustrative. The California Stations, 276 Simpson,

and TBA cases277 manifest a judicial intention to make real the oil
companies' claims that station operators are independent businessmen by insuring that they have the freedom to control and determine their conduct in the market that is implicit in the term independent business.278
Another example of the dynamics of distribution is the newspaper retailing business. In the Albrecht279 case, newspapers were

told that they could not enforce maximum price agreements with
independent delivery businesses.

The fact that the newspaper they

delivered was the only one in town, thus conferring on the deliverer
a local monopoly in the area of his route, did not confer special
privilege on the newspaper to set prices for the independent dis276. Standard Oil Co. (Cal.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
277. See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC,
381 U.S. 357 (1965).
278. One outcome of real independence is that dealers can begin to search for
alternate suppliers. In a recent case in Wisconsin a group of gasoline dealers were
able to get gas at significantly lower prices than their regular supplier charged when
they worked collectively through a broker. Milwaukee Journal, Oct. 7, 1974, at 1.
On a larger scale, the development of such buying groups could result in very substantial disruption of the existing, somewhat tattered oil ologopoly and probably
engender a new competitive atmosphere in the industry.
279. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). The message is still arriving
at the present time. See, e.g., Williams v. Independent News Co., 485 F.2d 1099 (3d
Cir. 1973); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Bowen
v. New York News, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Lepore v. New York
News, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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tributor. The Court did not, however, shield the delivery businesses
from the pressures of dynamic change. If the newspaper decided
to integrate its distribution system through the use of employeecarriers, there could be no objection even if independent businessmen lost their supply. In theory, at least, the deliverer could also
integrate by developing their own source of supply, i.e., a competing newspaper. Thus, the newspaper could achieve the end it
desired by proper use of form so long as it changed the function
of the parties as well as their formal relationship. 280
All of this does not foreclose an attack on the restraint of nonindependent entities. But such an attack would have to rest on a
showing that in fact such controls either were facilitating some
sort of producer-cartel arrangement, such as using only designated
haulers to insure price stability, or were adversely affecting entry
or other dynamic conditions. In the latter case, one would have
to show that desirable static efficiency advantages did not justify
the restraint or that the restraint resulted in an unlawful monopoly.
It should be recognized that the Court's approach does not mandate that all restraints on functionally independent businesses be
eliminated. If the restraint is being employed by a new entrant or
failing firm or the restraint is inherently required, it is lawful.
Once again this serves to solve the problem of providing the appropriate protection for both the dynamic and the static interests.
The protection afforded new entrants or failing firms has obvious
dynamic implication. There is, of course, no reason why a new
entrant or failing firm could not be trying to create a cartel just
as much as an established firm. If in fact a cartel is all that is
being created, the fact that its creators are new or failing firms
will not save the restraints. It will, of course, be difficult to separate the cartel from the efficiency cases, but in light of the dynamic
interest in stimulating entry in order to fragment power and the limited duration of the restraint, this is a burden worth undertaking.
Realistically, the probability is much higher that the restrictions
are part of a joint venture among firms in need of each other's
assistance to compete effectively than it is that a cartel is being
formed. The circumstances in these cases produce a strong argument for the ancillarity of the restraint and, therefore, the restraint should be more readily accepted as a socially desirable
280. Of course, where the effect of such changed control is to foreclose actual
competitors, the change may still be objectionable since, if we can regard a situation
involving unlawful monopoly as unreasonable monopoly, the method of monopolization ceases to be relevant in the usual cases. Cf. Lepore v. New York News, Inc.,
346 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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part of a dynamic process by which distribution channels are developed. Moreover, this argument does not confer indefinite immunity; at some point the participants must be freed from the restraints they have set up. Hence, even if an error is made in a
specific case, it will not create a perpetual cartel nor will it transfer to or entrench power in those already powerful. The social
costs of error in dynamic terms will therefore not be great. In addition, even if the producer does not fall within the dynamically
favored class, it can still defend essential restraints on functionally
independent businesses as inherently necessary. There are some
irreducible elements in the continuing producer-distributor relationship which require definition and explication. This explication
can only occur in the form of an understanding between producer
and distributor that, to be sensible and fair, must in some degree
impose duties on each party in a manner that can convey the understanding to others. When such agreements are fundamental to
business transactions, it is the task of contract and commercial law
to regulate their content in general and the task of antitrust only to
correct their abuses.
Finally, in a non-deterministic, dynamic world, there is the
policy question of whether and to what degree monopolistic competition is to be favored over pure competition and concomitantly,
how much the legal system will or can do to perfect either form of
competition. The choice between monopolistic and pure competition is not clear-cut. Each condition has certain socially desirable
aspects and either becomes more desirable as it approaches its perfect form. None of these choices are absolute. Perfection is always relative in the real world of nondetermined, dynamic change;
both pure and monopolistically competitive sectors will exist in
the economy. Policy must therefore focus on more or less monopolistic competition, more or less perfect in character. Moreover,
policy here involves an overview of many different but interrelated
legal threads from tax and trademark to antitrust. Overall, it is
clear that the legal system has accepted product differentiation as
valid and created many legal devices to make it possible. While
as an absolute proposition it is doubtful that there are many lasting advantages in newly differentiated soaps, toothpastes, or cars,
it does appear that in our economic world, investors require some
sort of assurance that their company has something unique to offer. Because of the existing state of competition in a broad range
of markets entry is much easier if based on some differentiation.
And, of course, that differentiation may be accomplished, at least in
part, through distribution activity.
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The three criteria for evaluating restraints perform well in separating the cases in which the differentiation, and its resultant effect on power, is desirable from those in which it is not. By rejecting cartels based on differentiated products, the first criterion
eliminates a kind of differentiation that has neither immediate
nor prospective social value. The second criterion encourages new
entrants to use distribution restraints to differentiate in order to take
power from existing producers of differentiated substitutes. This
both facilitates the success of the entrant and speeds existing
firms' adjustment toward a perfect equilibrium position, requiring
them to respond with innovation if they would retain power.
Finally, the third criterion limits the maximum degree to which an
established firm can retain power by use of restraints. This means
that the firms will adjust toward equilibrium more rapidly if the
world is static and new entry will be easier if the world is dynamic.
Thus, the three criteria, based on a nondeterministic view of
the realities of the economic world balance static and dynamic interests, permitting the resolution of a variety of issues in a way
that is both theoretically desirable and practically operational.
This does not mean, however, that the resulting rules are free from
fault. The derivation of this analysis rests on an explanation of
what the Court has done, not what it has said it was doing. Thus,
although these criteria seem to underlie the plethora of rules in vertical restraint law, the Court has neither articulated them nor made
clear the underlying policy problems presented by any attempt to
resolve the tension between static and dynamic approaches to vertical restraints, in particular, or to antitrust law in general. As a
result, application of the rules to new situations is frequently
muddled as neither the lawyer nor the judge has an understanding
of the basic policy issues involved or the way in which the Court
has resolved them.
This failure is especially significant with respect to the role of
ancillarity in antitrust analysis. The issue of ancillarity surfaces
fitfully in the cases. The government is normally opposed to the
idea because it tends to make rule of reason problems out of cases
in which an absolute rule is desired. Defendants, who are more
interested in very specific results than in elaborating a broad ideal,
usually use ancillarity analysis to justify whatever trade practice is
under attack. This suggests that all trade practices could be so
justified.
The problem in dealing with ancillarity is that neither the court
nor the litigants can ever be quite sure whether the defense is
allowable under a given Supreme Court case. A better articula-
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tion of the rules would minimize the problem but, at this point,
the Court and commentators have too few categories at their disposal with which to perform this task. Having only per se or rule
of reason classifications means that once a court is sure, as a general matter, that no broad inquiry is warranted in an area, it can
only label the result a per se rule. Consequently, the per se category acquired, in addition to its rules on naked restraints, a collection of special rules with respect to the illegality of restraints,
such as vertical restraints, which might be ancillary but whose ancillarity is irrelevant because the parties have failed to meet the threshold criteria. An analysis of ancillarity in vertical restraints in
dynamic terms, showing that such restraints could create economic
power, would have provided a basis from which to explain why
relatively absolute rules might be required; but such analysis has
not been made in the cases. Thus a more sophisticated classification of antitrust prohibitions has not occurred. Of course, the Court
handles vertical cases at the rate of one every few years, and therefore may not have the volume of cases to develop its own analysis
to any degree.
A deemphasis of the third criterion in favor of the second is,
with respect to the substance of the criteria, the better approach
because it is more consistent with the dynamic, nondeterministic
world in which business operates. To the extent that courts believe that a particular restraint is inherently necessary, they will
and should allow it. But in reaching a conclusion of necessity,
courts must be leery of the claims of business. When a restraint
is examined, it will probably appear essential, but the inquiry must
focus on the dynamics of change and the consequences of terminating the restraint. The value judgment as to what costs and inconveniences a business should be asked to bear in the short run
for the long run benefit of the economy is hard to make. While
courts should be deferential; they may be too deferential and fail to
look critically at the necessity for and the alternatives to a restraint.
In Schwinn, the Supreme Court created a high hurdle for defenders of restraints to leap. Given a strong faith in the innovative
capabilities of business, it should have been put no lower, and
perhaps higher. Unfortunately, many cases have lowered it and
have not been reversed. This trend, if continued, will substantially
reduce the dynamic value of the rules on vertical restraint.
As in Horatio's philosophy, so, too, in the static economic theory
of distribution: there are many things undreamed. When these
undreamed, dynamic aspects intrude upon the analysis, the apparent simplicity of the issues vanishes. But as the simplicity of the
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theory is exposed, the basis and operation of vertical restraint law
becomes more intelligible. The problem, both before and after
Schwinn, is to explain the basis of these rules so that they can be
sensibly applied. Only by integrating dynamic perceptions of how
an economy works into an explanation and evaluation of those
rules can they be made sensible or defensible.

